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ABSTRACT
How does the Holy Spirit, by indwelling believers, guide them to act in ways that
contribute to their spiritual progress? In this thesis, I will argue that, by indwelling
believers, the Spirit redirects their intentionality towards their ultimate end in union with
God, thus placing believers in the best possible position for acting in ways that contribute
to that end. If the Spirit guides believers in the spiritual life on a day-to-day basis, then
such guidance must connect with the actual processes by which humans generally act
(especially intentions). Thus, by exploring the indwelling of the Spirit, grace, and human
intentionality, we can come to a greater understanding of how the pieces fit together, how
the Spirit guides believers after baptism. The project will synthesize the rich
pneumatology of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae with insights from contemporary
philosophy of intention in order to develop a constructive account of the Spirit’s
indwelling and its implications for the actions of believers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
How does the Holy Spirit, by indwelling believers, guide them to act in ways that
contribute to their spiritual progress? In Scripture and throughout Christian tradition, one
of the most important aspects of the Spirit’s activity is that the Spirit indwells (is present
in a special way to) believers upon baptism, and one of the purposes of this indwelling
(though certainly not the only one) is that the Spirit might guide believers to live in ways
that enable them to grow in their pursuit of union with God. 1 However, affirming that the
Spirit acts in this way and providing an understanding (or even an account) of how the
Spirit might accomplish this action are vastly different tasks. 2 In this thesis, I will assume
that the former is true and I will explore the latter, an understanding of how the Spirit
might guide believers in the way just described.

1. For example, Paul says in Romans 8:14 (NRSV), “For all who are led by the Spirit of God are
children of God,” and in 1 Corinthians, “do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit
within you,” though Paul is of course referring to the indwelling in a communal way. In Christian tradition,
a perfect example is Gregory Nazianzen who not only argues that the Spirit indwells believers (Or. 41:11)
but that the Spirit’s most important work is to deify believers or transform them for the purpose of union
with God (Or. 31:28-29). Each of these texts can be found in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds., Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 7 (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004), 326-27 and 383
(respectively).
2. After all, even the indwelling language itself is often ambiguous, and so part of the thesis will
be spent in exploring what such an indwelling must mean in order for the Spirit to be able to guide
believers towards union with God.
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I will argue that, by indwelling believers, the Spirit redirects their intentionality
towards their ultimate end in union with God, thus placing believers in the best possible
position for acting in ways that contribute to that end. 3 If the Spirit guides believers in the
spiritual life on a day-to-day basis, then such guidance must connect with the actual
processes by which humans generally act (especially intentions). Thus, by exploring the
indwelling of the Spirit, grace, and the processes of human action, we can come to a
greater understanding of how the pieces fit together, how the Spirit guides believers after
baptism.
Account of the Issue
There has been a growing interest among contemporary theologians from all over
the denominational divide (including Pentecostalism) in the Holy Spirit and the Spirit’s
involvement in various aspects of the lives of believers. 4 Out of this growing interest,
there have been a number of refreshing areas that have received attention such as the
Spirit’s work in and through the physical/bodily practices of the Church such as baptism

3. By intentionality and intentions, I mean the mental state that is relevant for human action. I am
not referring to the meaning of the word in contemporary phenomenology, which is about “how every act
of consciousness, every experience, is correlated with an object.” For this quote and a further discussion of
the two uses of the word, see Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 8.
4. For an explanation concerning this growing interest in pneumatology in contemporary theology,
see Kenneth M. Loyer, God’s Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley
(Washington, D.C: CUA Press, 2014), 196-202; Kevin W. Hector, “The Mediation of Christ’s Normative
Spirit: A Constructive Reading of Schleiermacher’s Pneumatology,” Modern Theology 24 (2008): 1-2.
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and the Eucharist, 5 the Spirit’s work in creation, 6 and the Spirit’s involvement in the
Church’s pursuit of justice. 7 Although these works all affirm that the Spirit guides
believers in various ways, there has not been sufficient attention on precisely how the
Spirit, by indwelling individual believers, works in and through their action-related
processes on a day-to-day basis to transform them gradually towards divine-likeness.
Although the social dimension of the Holy Spirit’s activity in the Church is important, it
should not eclipse the way the Spirit is active in the lives of individual believers.
However, such a specific line of inquiry has not been wholly ignored.
Two recent writers who explore this issue in a preliminary way are William
Alston and Ray Yeo. In his essay “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit,” Alston investigates
“just what role the Spirit plays in bringing about these changes within the person.” 8
Alston argues that the Spirit enables believers to “share in the divine life.” On his sharing
model of the indwelling, “there is a literal merging or mutual interpenetration of the life
of the individual and the divine life, a breaking down of the barriers that normally
separate one life from another.” 9 The Spirit actually shares its “attitudes, tendencies, and

5. For this interest, see Eugene Rogers, After the Spirit: A Constructive Pneumatology from
Resources Outside the Modern West (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 45-68; Kathryn Tanner, Christ the
Key (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 274-301. There are also whole books on this issue
such as Reinhard Hütter, Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2000); James J. Buckley and David S. Yeago, Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in the
Practices of the Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001).
6. See D. Lyle Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” in Michael
Welker, ed., The Work of the Spirit: Pneumatology and Pentecostalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006),
71-86; Michael Welker, God the Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 279-342.
7. Ibid., 108-82, 228-79; Joerg Rieger, “Resistance Spirit: The Holy Spirit and Empire,” in David
H. Jensen, ed., The Lord and Giver of Life: Perspectives on Constructive Pneumatology (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 2008), 129-46.
8. See William Alston, “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit,” in Divine Nature and Human
Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 227.
9. Ibid., 246.
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values” such that they are as immediately present to the human person as that person’s
own psychological states. With such sharing, God allows humans to be aware of God’s
loving tendencies, enabling them to model their behavior and tendencies on God’s. Even
though believers would be immediately aware of the Spirit’s tendencies, their own human
tendencies would not transform immediately. Rather, it could be that God introduces to
them “initially weak, isolated, and fragile tendencies” that require human response and
initiative for them to build up their own “motivational system.” 10
Although Alston provides a viable account of the Spirit’s indwelling, there are
still a couple of problems with his account. First, it seems like God creates in humans
initially weak tendencies and leaves humans on their own to live in such a way as to
enable such tendencies to grow. Here Alston gives humans too large a role since his
account does not make sense of the continual implications of the Spirit’s indwelling for
believers. Conversely, such a position also does not take seriously enough the reality of
sin that renders believers continually in need of the Spirit’s assistance to overcome sinful
inclinations.
A second problem with Alston’s account is that his sense that God’s
psychological states could be directly shared with believers betrays a misunderstanding
of how vastly different God’s existence is from that of humans. 11 The Spirit’s
psychological states exist in an inherently Trinitarian or, as Yeo describes, perichoretic
structure. As a result, how could the psychological life of a being who eternally proceeds

10. Ibid., 251.
11. Ray S. Yeo, “Towards a Model of Indwelling: A Conversation with Jonathan Edwards and
William Alston,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 217-18.
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from the Father and Son and who shares a common nature with them be shared with
humans? Moreover, some mental states cannot be shared between two different agents
such as those tied to conscious experience or “indexical representational content.” 12 For
example, the idea “I am a divine person” could only be thought by God and could not be
shared with a human since then it would not apply. Finally, if God is a truly simple being
whose existence is the same as His essence, then it does not make sense to speak of
mental states in the way we can of humans. It would contradict God’s simple nature to
distinguish and separate various mental states in the divine mind so that they could be
individually shared with humans. Consequently, as Yeo states, “it is difficult to see how
the psychological, metaphysical, and ontological chasm between God and humanity can
be crossed to allow for a direct and literal partial merging of psychological lives.” 13
Yeo’s solution is to modify Alston’s account by 1) limiting the shared
psychological states to ones that “do not entail conscious subjectivity and indexical
representational content” and 2) including a Christological step so that what is shared
with believers is the human psychological life of Jesus. 14 Thus, believers do not share the
divine psychological life directly but only indirectly as it is “incarnated in the human
psychological life of Christ.” 15 What is shared with humans is the loving disposition of
Christ, which serves as the cause of sanctification in the believers. As in Jonathan
Edwards, the sharing of this loving disposition entails both a “good seeing disposition,”

12. Ibid., 217.
13. Ibid., 218.
14. Ibid., 224.
15. Ibid.
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by which one perceives and appreciates the goodness and beauty of God, and a
“motivational drive” to be unified with the object of one’s love, namely God. 16 Yeo calls
this dual aspect of the loving disposition of Christ the unitive drive. Despite being a
loving disposition, it is not equivalent to the theological virtue of love, but it is the drive
that gradually gives rise to that virtue in the believer. Thus, the unitive drive is initially
weak and is received gradually over time as one matures in the spiritual life.
One obvious problem with this account is that it seems like what really indwells
believers is Christ’s human unitive drive rather than the Spirit. Yeo foresaw this problem
and argued that we should distinguish the act of infusion from the content of what is
infused. Thus, the Spirit infuses Christ’s unitive drive to the believer’s mind, but is not
Himself infused since to say the Spirit is infused is to fall into the trap of Alston’s
account, a direct sharing of the psychological content of the divine mind with believers.
At the end of his account, then, the Spirit really does not indwell believers. Yeo must
conclude in this way but only because he assumes that the indwelling must entail a
sharing of divine psychological states with believers. Rather than rejecting Alston’s
sharing theory altogether, he merely adapted it to avoid the initial problem. However,
Yeo’s account runs into the opposite problem, namely that the unitive drive of Christ
creates an unnecessary barrier between the Spirit and believers since the indwelling does
not necessarily entail a psychological sharing of this sort. Separated by Christ’s human
unitive drive, believers are only able to receive the crumbs that fall from the table of the
triune life, but any viable account of the indwelling should be able to make sense of the
Spirit himself indwelling believers without falling into Alston’s dilemma.

16. Ibid., 226-27
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My proposal will seek to avoid both problems mentioned above by critically
appropriating the pneumatology of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a medieval theologian,
philosopher, and mystic. From Aquinas, we get an account of how the Spirit guides
believers by indwelling them that avoids the philosophical problems plaguing Alston’s
account, especially his understanding of the direct sharing of divine psychological states
with believers. For Aquinas, the Spirit, as the Love shared between Father and Son, truly
indwells believers, and this indwelling of the Spirit has a necessary created effect (love or
charity) on them, which makes possible their gradual participation in the divine nature
while not requiring a direct sharing of the Spirit’s own psychological states. 17 However,
this created grace does not act as a barrier between the Spirit and believers as the unitive
drive of Christ in Yeo’s account. Rather, created grace is the necessary effect of the
Spirit’s cognitive contact with believers, which mediates the Spirit’s influence over the
believer.
This mediation is important because the Spirit enables believers to grow
spiritually in a way that is proper to created existence, meaning through the believer’s
own action-related processes. Such mediation also means that the Spirit is not separated
from the Father and Son. The Spirit eternally proceeds or spirates forth as Love, but is
still able to indwell believers in this way. Furthermore, my account will show to an even
greater extent than Alston and Yeo how the Spirit guides the actions of believers by
articulating the resulting created effect of the indwelling and the corresponding types of
grace (habitual and auxiliary grace) as redirecting the intentionality of believers towards

17. See especially Marshall’s analysis in Bruce D. Marshall, “Action and Person: Do Palamas and
Aquinas Agree about the Spirit?” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 39 (1995): 387-88. In Aquinas, see
especially ST. I, 43, 3.
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union with God. Humans already intend many ends that are not union with God, so such
a redirection of believers’ intentionality entails not only redirecting believers in a general
way to intend union with God as their ultimate end through the theological virtues
(habitual) but also producing in believers intentions for particular actions that contribute
to that end (auxiliary)
By articulating the effect of the Spirit’s indwelling as the redirection of believers’
intentionality, I will grant the Spirit a fundamental role in the actions of believers while
leaving open the possibility for human error at the beginning of the believer’s gradual
pursuit of union with God. If an intention is a combination of relevant beliefs and desires
that serve some executive function over actions, then one must recognize that intending
union with God and whatever actions contribute to that end does not ensure that believers
will never sin but that such actions will appear more and more undesirable over time as
one is more convinced of the truth of the Christian faith (faith), desires that end to a
greater degree (hope), and comes to love God for God’s own sake (love). By drawing on
some of the contemporary literature on the philosophy of intention, I will bring the fruits
of Aquinas’s pneumatology into the spotlight while improving upon some of his outdated
conceptions of human action for a truly constructive account of how the Spirit, by
indwelling believers, guides them to act in ways that contribute to their ultimate end.
Contribution
This thesis will make three scholarly contributions. First, it articulates the
relationship between the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the actions of believers, both
of which are areas that have not received sufficient attention in contemporary
pneumatology. Second, it will contribute to scholarship on Aquinas by developing an
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account of how the various types of graces relate to Aquinas’s discussions of the Spirit’s
unique identity within the Trinity. Third, it will bring the tools of contemporary
philosophy of action into conversation with Aquinas’s pneumatology, a conversation that
will hopefully be fruitful for clarifying and developing Aquinas’s thought in ways that
draw attention to the constructive value (and some limitations) of his pneumatology.
Method
I will utilize Aquinas’s pneumatology and understanding of the indwelling of the
Holy Spirit found in the Summa Theologiae and related literature in order to offer an
account of the indwelling that does not fall into the problems of Alston’s and Yeo’s
accounts. 18 The Summa Theologiae is the text I will focus on because it represents the
highest point in the development of Aquinas’s positions on both grace and on the Spirit’s
unique appropriation of divine love. 19 Rather than only recognizing the importance of
habitual grace, Aquinas also developed a rich account of auxiliary grace that was a
necessary addition to his Aristotelian account of formal causation in the theological
virtues.
There are also a number of reasons Aquinas is so important for answering the
pneumatological question that governs this thesis. First, while Aquinas wrote, he engaged
a long tradition of theologians on issues involving the Holy Spirit and grace, so he had

18. For my translations of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, I will use the Blackfriars translation,
Summa Theologiae, 60 vols. (London and New York: Blackfriars, 1964-1976). From here on, I will cite the
Summa Theologiae with the notation (ST, Part, Question, and Article) such as ST. Ia, Q. 36, A. 1. For my
brief references to the Summa Contra Gentiles, I will use Summa Contra Gentiles, 5 vols., trans. Anton C.
Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke, and Charles J. O’Neil (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1975). For this I will cite (SCG, book, chapter, and section).
19. See especially Joseph Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 194.
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the opportunity to develop their insights in ways they did not envision in their own
intellectual context. For example, Aquinas clarified and developed Augustine’s account
of the different types of grace using the metaphysical tools of Aristotelian philosophy,
especially when it came to articulating various forms of causality in grace. 20 Such
metaphysical tools enabled Aquinas to articulate precisely how grace related to human
freedom, making his account very fitting for analyzing the issue that I am exploring here.
Second, Aquinas overcame problems that plagued his contemporaries’
discussions concerning the Holy Spirit and grace. For example, Peter Lombard argued
that the “movement of dilection (love) is from the Holy Spirit without any mediating
habit.” 21 Such a position would remove human freedom from the process of salvation
since the Spirit would simply have unmediated control of the human agent. Aquinas
demonstrated the problems with this position, provided alternative understandings of the
issues at hand, and showed how such a position was really a misreading of Augustine on
the Spirit as love. 22 Aquinas is thus a fitting figure from Christian tradition for thinking
through how the Holy Spirit, by indwelling believers, guides them to act in ways that
contribute to their spiritual progress.
In using Aquinas for this constructive account, I will not try to fit Aquinas’s
pneumatology into a contemporary framework that is antithetical to Aquinas’s arguments
but will take seriously Aquinas’s own reasoning on this issue and how the various pieces

20. See L. Matthew Petillo, “The Theological Problem of Grace and Experience: A Lonerganian
Perspective,” Theological Studies 71 (2010): 586-602. Petillo provides an excellent discussion of how
Aquinas developed Augustine’s key themes concerning grace.
21. See Daria Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace: Deification According to St. Thomas Aquinas
(Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2015), 218-21. See also ST. IIaIIae, Q. 23, A. 2.
22. See how Aquinas clarifies Augustine’s account of the Spirit as Love in ST. Ia, Q. 37, A. 2.
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of his account fit together. However, I will also critically evaluate what is fruitful in
Aquinas as well as what I think ought to be revised. Aquinas helps us to understand the
metaphysics of the indwelling and participation in the divine nature as well as the
different types of graces, but his discussions could be enhanced with some contemporary
understandings of human action. Thus, I will then also be in dialogue with the literature
of Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, and Alfred Mele for my discussion of human intention
and its relation to human action and agency. Ultimately, I will draw from Aquinas’s
treasury of pneumatological insight while also utilizing contemporary tools as they
contribute to exploring the issue at hand.
Outline of Chapters
This thesis will be structured in the following way. In chapter 2, I will show how
Aquinas’s account of how the Spirit guides believers by indwelling them overcomes the
two problems raised against Alston and Yeo in this chapter. I will start by offering
Aquinas’s Trinitarian account of how the Spirit indwells believers and will proceed to
show how his account of the Spirit’s indwelling relates to his discussions concerning how
the many types of graces relate to the actions of believers. Finally, I will show the
specific ways in which the account developed in the previous two sections overcomes the
difficulties raised against Alston and Yeo while also recognizing some areas in Aquinas’s
account that require clarification and constructive development.
In chapter 3, I will utilize some of the literature in the philosophy of intention in
order to develop Aquinas’s pneumatology in the ways outlined in chapter 2. I will first
lay out an account that understands intentions as mental states, entailing relevant beliefs
and desires, that trigger the relevant mechanisms that place persons in the best possible
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position to perform some action. Then, I will synthesize the discussion of intention with
the riches of Aquinas’s understanding of the indwelling and the various types of grace
(habitual and auxiliary) in order to develop a truly constructive account of how the Spirit
guides believers to act by indwelling them. Finally, I will offer and respond to two
possible objections to the account in order to gain even more understanding of how the
account contributes to the issue of this thesis.
In chapter 4, I will conclude the argument, provide an important implication of
the project for contemporary theology and Christianity more broadly, and offer some
areas of future investigation that the project raises.

CHAPTER II
AQUINAS ON THE INDWELLING AND THE ACTIONS OF BELIEVERS
Introduction
In this chapter, I argue that Aquinas’s account of how the Spirit guides the actions
of believers by indwelling them articulates how cognitive contact between the Spirit and
believers (as opposed to an indwelling of the human psychological states of Christ only)
is possible without collapsing the important distinction between God’s conscious
psychological states and those of believers (as opposed to a direct sharing of divine
psychological states). By distinguishing between uncreated and created grace, Aquinas
can propose that the Spirit is able to indwell believers as the uncreated gift of divine Love
given by God while also describing the resulting transformation in the believer as a
created gift from the Spirit, rather than as a reception of the divine conscious states
themselves. The following account will largely be drawn from the Summa Theologiae
with some reference to the Summa Contra Gentiles.
In the first section, I will articulate Aquinas’s Trinitarian account of the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit while paying special attention to the Spirit’s unique identity
within the triune life as Love and as Gift shared with believers. I will also explain
Aquinas’s distinction between uncreated and created grace and how that distinction
functions in his account of the Spirit’s indwelling. Second, I will show how Aquinas’s
conception of the indwelling connects with his understanding of grace and its effect on
human action. The created effect of the Spirit’s indwelling, namely habitual grace, entails
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a whole network of graces that give humans the potential for supernatural action,
enabling the Spirit to lead humans to act out of that potency. Third, I will evaluate the
constructive merits of Aquinas’s account of the indwelling in light of the problems raised
against the two contemporary accounts discussed in the introduction. Although Aquinas’s
account of how the Spirit indwells believers itself has much constructive value for
contemporary pneumatology, his understanding of how the various graces lead the
believer toward supernatural action needs clarification and development for it to be a
truly constructive account of how the Spirit guides believers’ actions by indwelling them.
Trinitarian Pneumatology and the Indwelling
Aquinas begins his account of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit with his
discussion of the Trinity since it is only due to the Spirit’s unique relationship to the
Father and Son that the Spirit is able to indwell believers and guide their actions.
Moreover, since the economic and the immanent Trinity are one and the same, the logic
of the Spirit’s unique identity in eternal relation to the Father and Son entails also the
possibility of the Spirit relating to believers in the economy of salvation. 1 For Aquinas,
the Spirit and thus the Spirit’s activity (indwelling) can only be distinguished from that of
the Father and Son by way of origin or procession since any other distinction would
nullify the real unity among the Trinitarian persons. 2 In order to demonstrate that the

1. This Trinitarian axiom originates from Karl Rahner. See his treatment in The Trinity (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 21-23.
2. Aquinas comes to this conclusion in his reflections on the problems with Arianism and
Sabellianism. Neither conceived of the possibility of processions in God as activities which remain within
the agent. See Gilles Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 55-56. In Aquinas, see ST. Ia, Q. 27, A. 4 and ST. Ia, Q. 27, A. 5. See also Gilles Emery, “The
Doctrine of the Trinity in St. Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed.
Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 52-53.
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Triune persons can maintain such ontological unity while being distinct in this way (i.e.
by procession), Aquinas employs the psychological analogy by which he distinguishes
between two mental acts that are immanent to the divine mind, namely intellect and will.
There are processions in God, not “as in corporeal realities, as a movement in
space or as an action of a cause producing an external effect” but as a movement “issuing
in the mind,” or as a mental act. 3 Each immanent mental act properly corresponds to
either the Son or Spirit based on their unique procession from the Father. 4 For example,
the act of the intellect corresponds to the second person of the Trinity, the Son, since the
Word (Logos in John 1) spoken by God is an action that remains in the divine mind. 5
Such a procession is unique (and thus constitutes a unique person) and distinct from the
procession of the Spirit because it is a generation from the Father of something that is a
likeness to the one from whom He came. In this case, the divine word conceived by the
divine intellect is a likeness to that very intellect just as a son is a likeness to his father. 6
Both analogies (Son/Father, Word/Intellect) are ways of articulating the procession that
renders the second person of the Trinity distinct from the Father.

3. ST. Ia, Q. 27, A. 2.
4. Admittedly, there is much controversy in contemporary Trinitarian theology in the classical
Western employment of the psychological analogy for understanding the Trinity. In particular, a critical
problem with the analogy is that it provides an oversimplified understanding of human mental acts.
However, even if the analogy fails in this regard, this in itself does not show that the analogy fails as a tool
for understanding the Trinitarian relations. The Spirit’s procession from the Father as the act of will and the
Son’s procession as act of intellect may be true of the Trinity even if the psychological analogy fails as a
way of thinking about the imago dei in humans, especially since such appropriations arise not only from the
philosophical psychology of Thomas’s time but also from Scripture.
5. ST. Ia, Q. 27, A. 2.
6. ST. Ia, Q. 34, A. 2.
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Alternatively, Aquinas conceives the Holy Spirit’s immanent procession as God’s
Love for Godself that arises in the will. 7 Love is a fitting name for the Holy Spirit
because for Aquinas the word spirit (breath, wind) naturally denotes impulse or
movement. Moreover, it is the nature of love to “move and urge the will of the lover” (the
person who loves) “towards the beloved” (the object of that person’s love) since one
desires to be with the object of one’s love. 8 It is thus on the basis of the Spirit’s nature as
other-oriented movement that love can be the proper act of the will that makes the
Spirit’s procession unique in the divine life. 9 Such a movement of the will is a procession
because the love or impulse that moves the lover towards the beloved is immanent to the
mind, the primary condition for any movement to be a divine procession. Although the
object of love is not immanent to the will in the same way that the object of the intellect
(Word) is, love does create an imprint of the beloved in the lover through the impulse that
draws the one who loves towards the object of his love. 10 Consequently, the procession of
the Son and the procession of the Spirit are not so different after all, at least in this
respect.
However, if the Son or Word’s relation to the Father (the eternal source of
divinity) is that of Father/Son or the source of divinity/the generation of a likeness to that
source, then the Spirit cannot merely be another Son. As it stands, there is no proper

7. For excellent explanation of how love can properly be called an immanent procession, see
Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 226.
8. ST. Ia, Q. 36, A. 1. Focus especially on Aquinas’s respondeo.
9. ST. Ia, Q. 36, A. 1. See also Eleonore Stump’s account of the philosophical psychology of love
with which Aquinas operates. See Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of
Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 90-107.
10. ST. Ia, Q. 37, A. 1. See also SCG. 4, 19, 10.
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distinction between the Son’s procession from the Father and the Spirit’s procession from
the Father. Aquinas’s solution to this distinguishing-dilemma is to argue that the Spirit
not only proceeds from the Father but also from the Son. 11 In fact, the Spirit proceeds
from the Father through the Son. Although this decision is admittedly controversial in
light of the Filioque controversy, Aquinas has good reasons for keeping this originally
Augustinian understanding of the Spirit’s procession. 12 First, as stated above, the Spirit’s
procession cannot really be distinct from the Son’s procession unless the Spirit also
proceeds from the Son because the only factor that can distinguish the Trinitarian persons
is their procession. 13 Thus, if the Spirit cannot have the Father-Son relation but still must
proceed from the Father, then the only other option is for the Spirit to proceed from both
of them. Second, there can only be one factor distinguishing Son from Father, namely
that one is the source of the triune life (Father) and the other is a generated likeness of
that source (Son). However, if the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, then the Father
is not only distinct from the Son in virtue of the Father-Son relation; the Father is also
distinct due to the procession of the Spirit. 14 Thus, for Aquinas, the Spirit’s procession
from the Son and the Father is a necessary step to ensure the distinctiveness of the
Spirit’s identity in the triune life (as well as that of the Son).

11. ST. Ia, Q. 36, A. 2.
12. For an excellent discussion of both the inherently theological and ecclesial issues involved in
this longstanding debate, see A. Edward Siecienski, The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-15.
13. ST. Ia, Q. 36, A. 2.
14. See Levering’s helpful discussion of Aquinas’s reasoning here in Matthew Levering, Scripture
and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 192-93.
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Whatever one makes of the technicalities of Aquinas’s account of the
psychological analogy, my point here is to emphasize that the Spirit’s unique
appropriation of the divine love makes it fitting for the Spirit to indwell believers. Since
the Spirit is the Love who proceeds from Father and Son, the Spirit is also the Love by
whom the Father and Son love each other. 15 The Spirit is thus the unifying force in the
Trinitarian life, the movement of the lover to the beloved, that draws Father and Son to
each other with the result that Father and Son are both lover and beloved to each other. 16
Of course, this insight does not nullify the way that love is an essential quality of all three
persons of the Trinity. However, although the three persons share an essential nature that
is love, their mode of loving is distinct according to their distinct processions. The Father
and Son’s mode of loving is to eternally “spirate Love” or send forth the Holy Spirit. 17
They love each other by the Holy Spirit who proceeds from and to each person. The Holy
Spirit, on the other hand, loves not by spirating love but by proceeding or spirating as
Love. Thus, love here is not only an essential quality applicable to all three persons but
also a personal appropriated quality unique to the Spirit. 18

15. ST. Ia, Q. 37, A. 1. See especially the 3rd reply. For an extended discussion of the
development of Aquinas’s thinking on the mutual love of Father and Son through the Spirit, see Kenneth
M. Loyer, God’s Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley
(Washington, D.C: CUA Press, 2014), 103-40.
16. See Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics 189-90.
17. See ST. Ia, Q. 37, A. 2. Aquinas’s language here is literally “spirare amorem” – to spirate
love. Aquinas further explains how the Father and Son, in spirating love, are the one principle (cause) of
the Holy Spirit as the source from which the Spirit proceeds. However, this dual procession does not entail,
as some Orthodox critique Aquinas as saying, making the Spirit subordinate to the Son, nor does it remove
the Father’s status as eternal source of divinity. First, the Spirit is not subordinate to the Son since these are
eternal relations and not willed effects, i.e. the Son does not choose to send the Spirit while the Spirit obeys
its master. Second, the Father is eternal source of both Son and the Spirit, so the Father’s status as eternal
source is not weakened by the Spirit’s procession from the Son. Both critiques apply to a caricature of
Aquinas’s position and fail to take Aquinas’s account of the Trinity seriously on its own terms. See also
Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 192-94.
18. ST. Ia, Q. 37, A. I.
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The Spirit’s unique identity as the Love shared between Father and Son and
proceeding from each includes the possibility for the Spirit’s unique relationship with
believers. 19 In being the Love by whom Father and Son love each other and proceeding
from both persons, the Spirit is also the Love by whom God loves human persons. 20
Moreover, the Spirit’s unique identity as the Love who proceeds in the Trinity renders the
Spirit especially fitting to be given to creatures as a gift in a way the Father and Son are
not. Regarding gifts, Aquinas says, “the basis of such gracious giving is love; the reason
we give something to another spontaneously is that we will good to him. And so what we
give first to anyone is the love itself with which we love him.” 21 In seeking to give good
gifts to believers, then, God first gives the love out of which such gifts are given. Since
the Spirit personally is the Love by whom God loves Godself and by whom God loves
humans, it is proper that the Spirit be given as the first gift to believers. Furthermore, just
as it is fitting for the Spirit to be given or to proceed in God’s immanent Triune life as
Love, so it is fitting for the Spirit to be given to believers in the economic Trinity as the
Love by whom believers also love God. There is thus a seamless unity between the
Spirit’s appropriated role in the triune life as love proceeding and the Spirit’s distinct role
as a gift to believers, namely to be given and to give himself as the first gift of Love
through whom all other gifts are given.

19. My point here is not that it was necessary that the Spirit relate to believers but only that the
Spirit’s unique identity held the possibility that the Spirit might relate to believers as one who is sent from
the Father and Son.
20. ST. Ia, Q. 43, A. 5. See especially the 2nd reply.
21. ST. Ia, Q. 38, A. 1.
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In describing this self-giving of the Spirit, Aquinas uses the classical language of
indwelling. He states, “God is not merely in the intelligent creature, but dwells there as in
his temple.” 22 Although such language of dwelling within one as if in a temple is helpful
as a metaphorical description of the relationship between believers and the Spirit, the
language is ambiguous on its own and leaves room for inappropriate interpretations of
what such an indwelling of the Spirit entails. 23 On the one hand, such language could
imply a conflation of the Spirit’s self-giving with the incarnation of the Word. In this
understanding, the Spirit’s indwelling would be a complete and unmediated union with
humans with the result that believers become incarnate Holy Spirits who are fully
conformed to the Spirit in the same way the human nature of the Word in Christ was fully
conformed to the divine nature, a change that would remove human agency from the
Christian life. 24
On the other hand, such indwelling language could separate the Spirit from the
Father and Son. Such a fallacy appears to befall certain contemporary pneumatologists
who insist on understanding the Spirit as bodily, as dwelling within bodies, as if the Spirit
were somehow separated from the Father and Son while being divided up and
proportionately placed into various human bodies. 25 Such an understanding leads to the

22. ST. Ia, Q. 43, A. 3.
23. Of course, such language cannot be discarded entirely since it is important both in Christian
tradition and Scripture. Thus, my approach here will continue to use such language but in a way that will
bring precision to what we mean when we use the word indwelling.
24. This is because in the incarnation there was no human agent who was not at the same time the
second person of the Trinity. There was only one agent who was both divine and human. The indwelling,
on the other hand, implies two agents, one who is divine and one who is human. To conflate the two would
be to remove human agency and replace it with the Spirit.
25. Of course, no one would openly admit this conclusion, but it is unclear how various
theologians who describe the Spirit as “seeking bodies” would articulate how the Spirit indwells believers
in such a bodily way. They often leave this metaphysical issue aside while they explore the implications of
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same problem as the previous attempt since there would still be an unmediated union
between humans and the Spirit, but it would also disrupt the eternal relations within the
triune life. Both of these erroneous conceptions of the indwelling over-literalize the
indwelling language instead of utilizing that language as a helpful metaphor for
explaining the Spirit’s ontological self-giving or finding more precise language for
discussing it.
Instead of over-literalizing the potentially dangerous language of indwelling and
falling into these fallacies, Aquinas clarifies what it means for the Spirit to indwell
believers by distinguishing between uncreated and created grace. The Spirit is the
uncreated Love (amor) who proceeds from the Father and Son and is fully given as God’s
gift of Love to believers, and this full cognitive contact between the intelligible Spirit and
the believer’s intelligible soul imparts a created imprint of the Spirit onto the soul,
namely the gift of love (caritas). 26 This created imprint is the transformation that the
Spirit gradually brings about in the soul (and so throughout the believer’s bodily
existence) in order to draw the believer into the triune life in a way proper to a created
being.
More particularly, the Love of God (Holy Spirit) gives himself to the soul in order
to give the created gift of love so that the believer might in turn gradually love God by

their bodily pneumatology. The issue is thus left open as to how the Spirit is able to proceed eternally from
Father (and Son) while indwelling human bodies (in a literal way?). For examples of this trajectory in
contemporary pneumatology, see Eugene Rogers, After the Spirit: A Constructive Pneumatology from
Resources Outside the Modern West (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 1-18; David H. Jensen, ed., The
Lord and Giver of Life: Perspectives on Constructive Pneumatology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox,
2008), 1-24 and 87-96.
26. The idea of love as something that the Spirit creates in us by indwelling us as the divine Love
is common to the SCG. See SCG. 4, 23, 8-11. Aquinas says, “sed ad ipsius effectus, secundum quos in
nobis habitat, qui in homine possunt augeri et minui.” See also ST. Ia, Q. 43, A. 5., especially in the second
reply.
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participating in God’s Love. Such created love entails a participation in that Love
because the divine Love is infinite whereas humans are finite and can only participate in
that divine love rather than being that Love essentially as the Spirit is. 27 This created
imprint or capacity for participation in Love is also the means by which the Holy Spirit is
present to the soul in the first place. As Marshall notes, “If God is to give us the highest
gift, ‘the eternal good of the creature, namely God himself,’ then he must, it seems, give
us the created means to receive him.” 28 Thus, simultaneously, created grace is both the
necessary transformative result of the Spirit’s cognitive contact with the soul and the very
means by which such contact is possible. 29
Created grace should not be understood as something that separates the Spirit
from humans; rather, created grace is the medium of the Spirit’s full contact with the soul
of the believer. To use Marshall’s metaphors for the indwelling in Aquinas, created grace
is less like mortar between bricks which separates one brick from another than like a
signet ring in wax. As Marshall explains,
In order to come into contact with sealing wax, a signet ring has to make an
impression upon the wax, giving the wax its own shape at every point. Unless the
ring creates this impression, there is no contact with the wax, but only distance.

27. ST. Ia, Q. 43, A. 5. See again the 2nd reply. Aquinas states, “Since the Holy Spirit is Love, the
likening of the soul to the Holy Spirit occurs through the gift of charity and so the Holy Spirit’s mission is
accounted for by reason of charity.”
28. See Bruce D. Marshall, “Ex Occidente Lux?: Aquinas and Eastern Orthodox Theology,”
Modern Theology 20.1 (2004): 29.
29. This understanding of created grace as both created effect of the Spirit’s presence as well as
the means by which the Spirit is present in believers was held in different ways by a number of figures such
as Lonergan, Rahner, and Congar. See Robert Doran, “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and the Divine
Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei.” Lonergan Workshop 23 (2012): 167-69. For Congar’s
understanding, see Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, Vol. 2, trans. David Smith (New York: Herder
and Herder, 1983), 83.
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The impressed form of the ring is necessary in order to eliminate this distance,
and genuinely conform the wax to the ring. 30
Thus, in the same way that the ring’s contact with the wax makes a necessary imprint of
itself in the wax, so the Spirit’s ontological contact with the believer’s soul leaves a
necessary imprint or created transformative effect by which the Spirit is joined to the
believer. Such an understanding entails that the Spirit’s self-giving is logically prior to
the created effect, though such priority need not be temporal since there is no time in
which the Spirit indwells without the created effect. 31
The distinction between uncreated and created grace entails a real presence of the
Spirit to the soul, but this understanding of the language of indwelling does not conflate it
with Christ’s Incarnation. According to the Chalcedonian definition, Christ’s Incarnation
entails a union between the divine and human nature in a single person. The second
person of the Trinity did not enter into a human person and take over his agency since
Christ’s human nature never existed except as unified with his divine nature. Although
the language of indwelling can appear to be a direct union of the sort described here by
the Chalcedonian definition, the uncreated/created distinction provides a way to avoid
articulating the indwelling as another example of what Christ did in the Incarnation. 32
Believers are not incarnated Holy Spirits, but human agents who are transformed by the

30. See Marshall, “Ex Occidente,” 29-30. See also Bruce D. Marshall, “Action and Person: Do
Palamas and Aquinas Agree about the Spirit?” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 39 (1995): 388-89.
31. See Daria Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace: Deification According to St. Thomas Aquinas
(Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2015), 65-66.
32. However, the indwelling is not disconnected from the incarnation. After all, the Spirit
gradually draws believers into the triune life, which also means being gradually united to the Son. Such a
gradual union means that whereas Christ’s perfected human nature entailed the possibility of the perfection
of believers, the Spirit’s indwelling helps to make that an actuality.
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Spirit through created grace, the very medium by which the Spirit is fully given to the
believer while not conflating the distinction between human agents and God.
By providing precision to the language of indwelling, the uncreated/created
distinction also manages to provide a way to understand the Spirit as indwelling the
believer in this participatory/transformative way while also existing in eternal union with
the Father and Son. 33 There is no separation between the Spirit and the Father and Son
because the Spirit does not need to break away from the triune life in order to indwell
humans. The Spirit gives the created gift of love by which He is able to truly indwell
believers, but such an indwelling is not a spatial indwelling. The Spirit does not have to
leave the triune life to go someplace else; rather, the Spirit spatially and temporally
indwells only insofar as the transformation that the believer undergoes exists on a spatial
and temporal plane. 34 Such a non-spatial contact with believers is not only important for
the integrity of the triune life, but is also important for the believer’s gradual progress
towards that life. By both indwelling believers and existing in eternal union with the
Father and Son, the Spirit enables believers, by the created gift of love, to enter into and
indeed participate in the life of God that is itself bonded together by the Love of unity
who is the Holy Spirit.
The Indwelling, Grace, and the Actions of Believers in Aquinas
Out of this account of the Spirit’s indwelling, Aquinas develops a distinctive
understanding of how the Spirit, by indwelling believers, guides them to act in his
treatment on grace in the Secunda Pars. Although the Spirit is rarely mentioned explicitly

33. Any mention of the language of the Spirit’s indwelling will be meant in this particular way
through the rest of the project.
34. See especially the passage in the SCG. 4, 23, 11.
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in this treatment of grace, the whole discussion presumes what has already been said in
the Prima Pars concerning the Spirit’s indwelling. As Torrell has argued, Thomas often
called the Treatise on Grace the “grace of the Holy Spirit (gratia Spiritus Sancti).” 35 In
fact, the treatment of how grace guides the actions of believers expands upon what
Aquinas already said concerning both what created grace (the created means of
participating in the Spirit) is and what it accomplishes in the spiritual life of believers.
Aquinas’s clarification and development of the nature of this created grace centers
on both habitual and auxiliary grace. Habitual grace serves as a new capacity or form for
action that enables believers not only to act in accordance with human nature but also to
participate in the divine nature. 36 Although all beings participate in God insofar as they
exist with some nature and rely on God for their subsistence, no being on its own can act
outside of its nature, whether human or otherwise. Since the intellect is the form or nature
that makes someone human rather than something else, human nature then involves
acting in accordance with the intellect or reason. 37 However, through habitual grace, the
Spirit enables believers to act in ways that transcend what is reasonable for them to do.
Such participation means that just as reason serves as the natural form for human action,
habitual grace serves as a new form for human action that is supernatural (i.e., it is action
that is oriented by God towards God’s perfect divine nature, not just action that can be

35. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 2: Spiritual Master, trans. Robert
Royal (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 115. In fact, Torrell explored
numerous texts throughout Aquinas’s corpus in order to demonstrate that the reason Thomas does not
mention the Holy Spirit explicitly very often was that the Spirit was everywhere in Aquinas’s writings.
Every mention of grace related to the Holy Spirit’s activity.
36. See John Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in
Eternal Law (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2009), 154. In Aquinas, see ST. IaIIae, Q. 110, A. 1.
37. See discussion in Spezzano, Glory of God’s Grace, 139-41. The relevant text from Aquinas is
ST. IaIIae, Q. 110, A. 1.
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arrived at by simple practical reasoning or syllogism). Indeed, as a type of habitus, such
grace is “a potency, a steady disposition to act in a certain way,” in this case, in a way
that moves one toward and enables one to participate in God. 38
A potential for supernatural action by itself, however, does not entail that the
potential will be actualized. As Aquinas states, “we see in the natural world that for
movement is required not only that intrinsic form which is the principle (capacity) of
movement or action; there is also required the actual motion of the primary mover.” 39
Even though the Spirit, by indwelling believers, imparts the created gift of habitual grace
that enables believers to perform actions that are supernatural, believers also need to be
moved by the Spirit to perform actions that fit this new capacity since they only have this
capacity imperfectly and are not in full possession of it like they are when it comes to
their natural capacity to act in accordance with reason. 40 It is by this auxiliary (auxilium),
or helping, grace that the Spirit actualizes the potency of believers and moves them to
perform actions that help them grow towards the divine nature through participation.
Ultimately, both types of grace are necessary for believers to reach their supernatural goal
of eternal blessedness with God.

38. See Joseph Wawrykow, “Grace,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 194. Aquinas
calls this type of influence of the Spirit over action formal causality.
39. ST. IaIIae, Q. 109, A. 1.
40. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 68, A. 2. In one of his clearest discussions of the issue, Aquinas says, “On
the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be
moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon
which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the
medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by
himself, but needs to receive instructions from him.”
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Aquinas further divides habitual and auxiliary grace each into operative and
cooperative categories, which help to further clarify metaphysically how the Spirit’s
indwelling connects with human action at the levels of capacity and act. When it comes
to auxiliary grace, Aquinas distinguishes between the interior act of the will by which one
wills a certain good or action (operative) and the exterior action in which one brings the
willed action to material completion (cooperative). 41 Operative auxiliary grace
corresponds to “this interior act of will in which the will behaves as moved by God as
mover.” 42 By moved, Aquinas means that God causes the believer to will a certain action,
thus bringing the believer to the volitional position in which she is about to perform the
action. By causing believers to will certain actions that are befitting of their divine end,
God also cooperates in their actually doing the action. Since any external act is “ordained
by the will, it follows that the operation involved in this act is attributed to the will. And
since for this act too God helps us, both by confirming the will within so that it might
achieve its act and by providing the means of action without,” God is then behind the
external action though indirectly and thus in a cooperative way. 43 God, then, moves
humans through their own volitional processes in order that they might progress from
merely having this supernatural capacity due to the Spirit’s indwelling to then acting out
of that capacity and performing actions that contribute to their continued spiritual growth.

41. For an excellent treatment of these different aspects of habitual and actual grace, see Spezzano,
Glory of God’s Grace, 126-28; Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992), 270-72. See also Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St.
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 41-61, 134-37.
42. ST. IaIIae, Q. 3, A. 2.
43. ST. IaIIae, Q. 3, A. 2.
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Habitual grace also contains operative and cooperative aspects that spring from
Aquinas’s metaphysics of form, namely esse (being) and operari (operation)
respectively. 44 In its operative function, habitual grace “heals or justifies the soul and
makes it pleasing to God,” in that the believer is saved from past sin and her volitional
and cognitive faculties are healed from the residual effects of sin. 45 As the result of such
volitional and cognitive healing, habitual grace also elevates believers to a new form of
existence (esse), namely participation in the divine nature as was stated before. Habitual
grace thus enables believers to participate in the divine nature by removing what
separates the two (both past sins and residual volitional effects of sin) and raising humans
to this divine plane of existence. In its cooperative function, habitual grace is the
“principle of meritorious action, which proceeds from free choice.” 46 Meritorious action
entails actions (operari) that are befitting of the new divine nature humans are given in
that their origin is in the Spirit’s activity, and they are able to merit eternal reward from
God through such actions. 47 Habitual grace is the principle of meritorious action because
it provides the possibility of such actions being accomplished by human free will. In
terms of the metaphysics of form, this means that habitual grace provides both a new
form of existence and the capacity to live out of that new existence.

44. For a discussion of these different aspects of habitual grace, see Spezzano, Glory of God’s
Grace, 128. See also Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 44.
45. ST. IaIIae, Q. 3, A. 2.
46. ST. IaIIae, Q. 3, A. 2.
47. For a discussion of the relationship between grace and merit, see Joseph Wawrykow, God’s
Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1996), 166-83. Wawrykow gives a great deal of attention to the passages in the Summa
concerning habitual grace and merit.
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After all, auxiliary grace by itself cannot move an unwilling will to do the good
since humans already seek ultimate happiness through a variety of means that are not
directed towards God. 48 Moreover, without the healing of their nature brought about by
habitual grace, humans would still suffer from their sinful dispositions that both prevent
them from pursuing the goods that are natural to human nature and make impossible any
sort of action that surpasses that nature. 49 As a result, God must dispose humans through
habitual grace to be moved by the Holy Spirit’s auxiliary grace in order that “they may be
moved by him sweetly and promptly towards obtaining the eternal good.” 50 Habitual
grace is able to bring about this transformation because it is out of this contact that the
Spirit is able to impart to believers the theological virtues, infused cardinal virtues, and
gifts, which are infused supernatural inclinations that, in different ways, direct believers
towards God as their ultimate end.
As supernatural inclinations, the theological virtues faith, hope, and love direct
believers’ actions towards union with God by disposing the intellect and will to move
towards this divine end. 51 The human faculties need to be disposed towards God because
on their own they can only operate on the basis of what the intellect deems a rational end
worth pursuing. This distinction between the natural functioning of the faculties and their
elevated supernatural function makes sense if we think through Aquinas’s distinction
between the theological virtues and the acquired cardinal virtues. The cardinal virtues are

48. Aquinas lists as possible examples wealth, honor, power, glory, and pleasure among others.
See ST. IaIIae, Q. 2, A. 1-8.
49. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 85, A. 1; ST. IaIIae, Q. 109, A. 3.
50. ST. IaIIae, Q. 110, A. 2.
51. See discussion in Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 158; Rziha also provides the citation from
ST. IaIIae, Q. 26, A. 3.
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dispositions for actions that are guided by natural reason alone. 52 For example,
temperance is a disposition towards self-control in all things. One is a temperate person if
she does not do anything in extreme excess or deficiency. 53 However, although
temperance leads to actions that are good and guided by reason, one can have self-control
and not have faith in God or desire union with God.
When guided by these cardinal virtues, human intellect and will perform actions
that are guided by reason. The intellect proposes a rational good to be pursued and
considers the proper means for attaining the good while the will desires the good
proposed by the intellect and commands the body to act. 54 However, performing actions
in accord with reason does not mean that one’s actions entail participating in the divine
nature in a supernatural way, nor does it entail growth towards the likeness of Christ. 55
Human intellect and will, then, must be elevated through infused supernatural
dispositions since one cannot attain these dispositions through repetitive actions alone
like other virtues or habits. These supernatural dispositions must be infused directly by
the Spirit as part of the created, habitual effect by which the Spirit indwells believers.
Such supernaturally infused dispositions each have their own role to play in
directing the believer’s faculties towards God. Faith elevates the believer’s intellect to
“receive certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of the Divine light:

52. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 61, A. 2.
53. ST. IIaIIae, Q. 141, A. 1.
54. For this insight, see especially Aquinas’s discussion of prudence in ST. IIaIIae, Q. 47, A. 3.
55. After all, for Aquinas, even before the Fall, humans could not pursue supernatural good. In his
discussion of grace, Aquinas says, “In the state of intact nature…man could by his natural endowments will
and perform the good which was proportionate to his own nature, which is to say the good of acquired
virtue; but he could not will or perform the transcendent good, which is to say the good of infused virtue.”
See ST. IaIIae, Q. 109, A. 2.
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these are the articles of faith.” 56 The Spirit essentially moves the intellect to assent to
these true propositions of faith by entering into the believer’s cognitive processes and
disposing the intellect to trust in these truths. Moreover, the Spirit elevates the human
will through both hope and love. Hope directs the human will towards actions that enable
one to progress towards union with God as an end that is attainable with divine
assistance. 57 Finally, love is the disposition by which the will is directed towards God by
gradually binding humans and the Spirit into a spiritual union that “transforms the will
for that end.” 58 Love is supreme over the other theological virtues, not only because it
constitutes the believer’s unity with the Holy Spirit who is Love but also because love
quickens and perfects the growth of faith and hope in the believer. 59
Although love is the most important of the theological virtues, it is last in terms of
temporal succession. Faith must come first because one can neither hope for nor love
someone or something of which one is unaware. The intellect must know God through
the articles of faith before the will can be moved towards this good which the intellect
proposes, at least in Aquinas’s way of thinking about these faculties. Hope follows from
faith because one “hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone” before “he
looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own.” 60 Finally, “for the very reason

56. ST. IaIIae, Q. 62, A. 3.
57. See ST. IIaIIae, Q. 17, A. 6.
58. ST. IaIIae, Q. 62, A. 3.
59. As we can see, although the theological virtues are not acquired as a result of our habitual
actions, they can be increased by one’s living in light of elevated human nature. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 62, A. 4;
IIaIIae, Q. 23, A. 8. It must also be recognized at this stage that the Eucharist also has an important role in
increasing one’s loving disposition. I will say more about this in the next chapter.
60. ST. IaIIae. Q. 62, A. 4. See also IIaIIae, Q. 17, A. 7. Here Aquinas says, “Hope is concerned
with a future and difficult good, but one, nevertheless, that remains possible; so much so that the mere fact
of hoping would be out of the question if the hoped-for good did not appear possible.”
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that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him.” 61 Since love comes last
temporally, it then is able to increase and reinforce the other two virtues (as well as the
other dispositions associated with habitual grace) out of the fact that one acquires
stronger belief/trust and hope in someone when he or she loves that person. All three
theological virtues that are infused into the soul by the habitual, created effect of the
Spirit’s indwelling thus work together to direct both the intellect and will of the believer
to perform actions that are befitting of the believer’s supernatural end and ultimately
toward love, the highest form of the virtues as well as the most fundamental means of
participation in the Holy Spirit. 62
Although these theological virtues, especially charity, are meant to dispose
believers to be moved by the promptings of the Holy Spirit in auxiliary grace, they are
not sufficient on their own for ensuring that humans always act properly in light of their
grace-filled nature. Charity directs the believer towards God as his ultimate end, but one
must still be further disposed towards those ends that are in accord with that ultimate
end. 63 Thus, in addition to charity, further moral virtues must be infused into the believer
to direct the believer still more properly towards actions that aid one in growing towards
the perfect humanity of Christ and participating in the divine nature. As Aquinas states,
“all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through
them that man performs each different kind of good work.” 64 Along with charity, and

61. ST. IaIIae. Q. 62, A. 4.
62. For a discussion of how the theological virtue of love is a participation in the Holy Spirit, see
Spezzano, Glory of God’s Grace, 220-24.
63. For the relationship between the theological virtues and those dispositions that dispose one
towards those proximate ends (the infused cardinal virtues), see Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 174-80.
64. ST. IaIIae, Q. 65, A. 3.
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with it faith and hope, one also receives the infused virtues as well since charity is the
“mother and root of all the virtues” and “the form of all of them.” 65 One can acquire these
virtues in some limited way before baptism, but one needs the infused cardinal virtues in
order that particular types of actions related to the different virtues might be directed
towards God as their end rather than simply whatever end reason proposes.
Through the Spirit’s indwelling, believers are thus not only directed towards God
in a general way through faith, hope, and love, but also by these infused moral
dispositions that grant the believer greater conformity in particular ways to the Holy
Spirit’s promptings. Along the lines of this distinction between the general and the
particular, Rziha makes a comparable distinction between merely formal conformity and
material conformity to the divine will. 66 To see this distinction at work, Aquinas raises
the example of one who seeks to give alms by stealing the money from other people. 67
Although the person had the right idea in seeking to give money to the poor, the way he
went about trying to accomplish this end was deeply mistaken. The person was mistaken
concerning what actions actually serve as proper means for attaining that proximate end
(giving alms) while being in accord with the person’s ultimate end. One might say that
the person’s heart was in the right place, but he was ignorant of what he was actually
doing. He was in formal conformity to God’s will, but he was not in material conformity,
meaning that in actuality he did not act in the best way towards attaining Christ-likeness.
Alternatively, the infused versions of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude dispose

65. ST. IaIIae, Q. 62, A. 4. See also the discussion in Spezzano, Glory of God’s Grace, 238-39.
66. Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 175-78.
67. For this example in Aquinas, see ST. IaIIae. Q. 18, A. 7.
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believers not only to be directed to God formally and generally but also materially by
directing particular types of actions towards God. 68
The infused virtues not only enable the will to be in greater conformity to
whatever actions reason proposes as one’s proper end, but through prudence the person
becomes more properly disposed to selecting ends that are truly in conformity with the
divine will. 69 Thus, the focus of the infused virtues is on disposing both will and intellect
to be in greater conformity with one’s divine end by selecting the correct goods that will
bring one closer to that end. However, the infused cardinal virtues are limited in their
scope because their goal is still the proper alignment of the will and intellect with reason
even if they are directed towards God by the theological virtues (especially love).
Moreover, they are still inclinations, meaning that they merely provide the potential for
particular supernatural actions towards certain divinely oriented goods, but they do not in
themselves ensure that the believer will perform such actions.
After all, the theological virtues and infused cardinal virtues flow out of habitual
grace, which still requires the direct auxiliary movement of the Spirit to lead the believer
to act out of his or her new supernatural inclinations by moving the will to choose actions
befitting one’s divine end. As Aquinas states,
But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him,
according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological

68. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 65, A. 1. Aquinas says, “the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to
do a good deed well” not only to mean well but to actually do a good action in the proper way.
69. For a discussion of the cardinal virtues (including prudence) as they are elevated towards God,
see ST. IaIIae, Q. 61, A. 5.

35
virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the
prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost. 70
Consequently, in order for one to move ever more closely toward one’s divine end,
further gifts of the Spirit are necessary so that one might be “disposed so as to be
amenable to the promptings of God.” 71 The gifts of the Holy Spirit are dispositions just
like the theological virtues and infused cardinal virtues, but their focus is on enabling
believers to promptly and readily obey the auxiliary impulse of the Spirit on a consistent
basis.
Like the other virtues, the gifts ultimately arise out of the theological virtue of
love (caritas) since love is the most fundamental means by which the Spirit is in direct
contact with the believer. In fact, with the infusion of love, one also has all the infused
dispositions (virtues and gifts), which grant believers the potential for supernatural
actions while not necessarily bringing such potential to actuality. 72 Additionally, as
Stump notes, despite arising from the virtue of love, the gifts act as enzymes for the
theological virtues, further anchoring such virtues in the intellect and will of the believer
and constantly leading to actions that are befitting of his or her supernatural end. 73
Moreover, such gifts also facilitate the application of the infused cardinal virtues. In fact,
for each infused cardinal virtue, there is at least one gift that anchors the virtue in the

70. ST. IaIIae, Q. 68, A. 2.
71. ST. IaIIae, Q. 68, A. 1.
72. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 68, A. 5. Aquinas states, “Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united
together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.”
73. See Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics: Aquinas on the
Passions,” Faith and Philosophy 28 (2011): 35. I merely make reference to Stump to gain clarity on what
exactly the gifts of the Holy Spirit do. I do not intend to affirm everything she argues in this article.
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relevant faculties so that one will act out of that inclination as he or she is prompted by
the Spirit. 74 The goal of the gifts is that the believer might live into all the infused
inclinations he or she has and be completely attuned to the Spirit by responding properly
and consistently to the Spirit in the bond of love that exists between the Spirit and the
believer (the Amor with the participating caritas).
We see then that Aquinas offers an entire vision both for how the Spirit indwells
believers and for how the indwelling guides believers towards actions that contribute to
their proper end in union with God. The Spirit is the personal Love shared between
Father and Son in the Triune life and as such is properly given to humans as God’s Love
for believers. As the result of this ontological self-giving in the indwelling, the Spirit
imparts a necessary created effect in the soul of the believer that not only acts as the
means by which such an indwelling or cognitive contact is possible, but is also a habitual
effect since it elevates human nature to a higher plane of existence that is supernatural
and disposes humans to act in accordance with it. Through the various types of infused
virtues and the gifts, believers are inclined in manifold ways towards being easily led by
the Holy Spirit’s promptings for supernatural actions towards the divine end of human
existence, the beatific vision.
A Constructive Account?
Although I have explained Aquinas’s account of how the Spirit guides the actions
of believers by indwelling them, does the account overcome the constructive difficulties
that plagued Alston’s and Yeo’s contemporary analytic accounts of the indwelling as

74. For the virtues that concern reason, there are the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, understanding,
and counsel. For the virtues that concern the will, there are the gifts of fortitude, piety, and fear. See ST.
IaIIae, Q. 68, A. 1.
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discussed in the introduction? Alston problematically argues that the Spirit directly shares
his own psychological states with believers in the indwelling. Moreover, an additional
problem with Alston’s account is that some mental states cannot be shared by different
persons such as those tied to conscious experience or “indexical representational
content.” 75 Alternatively, Yeo’s account of the Spirit’s indwelling entails an indwelling
of Christ’s human psychological states rather than the Spirit Himself. Admittedly, the
Christological worries that motivate his understanding of the indwelling are justified. 76
Nevertheless, although Yeo is worried about subordinating Christ in the indwelling, his
account drifts into the opposite mistake, namely giving the Spirit a subsidiary role in the
journey of the believer towards beatitude. He is no longer speaking about the indwelling
of the Spirit but an indwelling that the Spirit merely helps along.
Aquinas is able to avoid the problems I raised against Alston’s account because
the psychological states that enable humans to participate in the divine life and move
towards beatitude are specifically created for humans. The Holy Spirit indwells the
believer, and this full cognitive contact between the Spirit and the believer leaves a
necessary created imprint on the soul through which the entire network of habitual and
auxiliary graces that lead the believer towards beatitude are infused into the soul.
Through this created gift, the relevant volitional elements the believer receives are
created by God but are entirely the believer’s own rather than God’s own psychological
states. Consequently, God’s simple and Trinitarian existence can still be radically

75. See Ray S. Yeo, “Towards a Model of Indwelling: A Conversation with Jonathan Edwards and
William Alston,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 217.
76. It is justified because focusing too much on the indwelling can make it appear that Christ is out
of the picture, but this is certainly not the case in Aquinas, even if here I have focused more on the Spirit
than Christ.
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different from the way humans exist, and this fact does not render the Spirit’s indwelling
impossible. It only means that the Holy Spirit indwells and guides the actions of believers
in a way that Alston did not conceive.
In response to Yeo’s account, Aquinas does not need to pose an intermediary
Christological step in his account of the Spirit’s indwelling. Since the Spirit indwells
believers through the medium of created grace, there is no direct sharing of the divine
nature such that believers become essentially additional members of the Trinity. Rather,
humans experience the divine nature in a uniquely created way, indeed the only way
created beings could participate in the divine nature. Thus, Aquinas is able to have his
cake and eat it too; he is able to pose that the Spirit actually indwells the believer through
created grace, while not necessarily implying that humans somehow become what God is,
essentially. However, Aquinas’s way of conceiving the indwelling need not imply
removing Christ from the spiritual life as Yeo attests. It is only on account of the total
union of the divine and human natures of Christ and the salvific effects of his passion that
humans are able to participate in the divine nature in the first place. The Spirit indwells
believers and imparts created grace as the direct result of that indwelling, but the created
effect that is fulfilled in love (caritas) must be understood as the perfect love of Christ in
whom the Spirit, who is the Love of Christ, also dwelled. 77 In this way, it is only because
the Spirit indwelled Christ in his perfect human nature that the Spirit can also gradually
draw us towards that same perfected human nature of Christ.
Where Yeo goes wrong is in assuming that, instead of the Holy Spirit, it is
Christ’s perfected human nature that indwells humans. What Yeo needs is a greater sense

77. See Spezzano, Glory of God’s Grace, 174-80.
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of how his account is still an account of the Spirit’s indwelling, something that Aquinas
accomplishes through his metaphysical distinction between uncreated and created grace.
Ironically, Yeo argues against the “Thomistic tradition” on the grounds that “the grace
that is infused within the soul is ‘created grace’” or better yet just created grace. 78 He
understands Edwards as a better alternative to Aquinas since Edwards “equates the love
of God with the Holy Spirit and sees the person of the Spirit as that which is infused in
the saints.” 79 However, Yeo would then not only argue against Edwards on this very
point, but he would also put forward an understanding of the indwelling that entails a
type of created effect (Christ’s human unitive drive) that comes between the Spirit and
humans. Not only has Yeo mischaracterized Aquinas’s account entirely, he ends up
rejecting his own critique of Aquinas’s position.
Where these two contemporary attempts have failed to develop a viable
constructive account of the indwelling, Aquinas is able both to overcome their problems
and at the same time connect the indwelling to the life of the Trinity, enabling humans to
truly participate in God in a way especially fitting for human nature (i.e. through the
created transformation enacted by the Spirit). As a result, Aquinas’s account of how the
Spirit guides believers to act by indwelling them cannot merely be shoved aside as a relic
from a time long ago but must be constructively engaged in contemporary pneumatology.
However, having constructive value does not entail that the account as a whole can
simply be lifted from its context and dropped into contemporary theology. With this in
mind, there are some areas of Aquinas’s thought, especially concerning the connection

78. See Yeo, “Towards a Model,” 213.
79. Ibid.
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between the indwelling and the actions of believers, that require greater clarification and
development.
One limitation of Aquinas’s account is the lack of a fleshed out sense of the
earliest spiritual development of the believer. Aquinas discusses many types of graces
including the theological virtues, infused cardinal virtues, and the gifts, but there is not a
clear articulation both of how these types of graces initially guide the believer when he or
she has just converted (especially against the effects of residual sinful inclinations) and of
how they grow over time in drawing the believer towards God. For example, upon
baptism the theological virtues are infused into the soul, and Aquinas gives a temporal
sequence for their acquisition (i.e. faith, then hope, and finally love). However, it isn’t
clear how the theological virtues initially change the believer’s way of life after baptism.
In other words, what actually happens to the believer when the Spirit first
indwells her? Does the believer come out loving God completely or do the theological
virtues function in experience as initially weak inclinations upon baptism that grow over
time? The problem becomes even more complicated when we throw into the mix the
infused cardinal virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Should we understand all of these
inclinations as being infused all at once when the Spirit indwells the believer or does the
believer grow in the theological virtues first while the other virtues come later as one
grows in the spiritual life? In other words, how do these inclinations actually work “on
the ground” when the Spirit indwells and transforms human experience, and how do they
develop as one performs more and more supernatural actions, guided by the Spirit? 80

80. This problem is very similar to the issue raised by Lonergan about the role of habitual grace.
He states, “there does remain the objection from experience that the infused virtues do not appear always to
make right action prompt, easy, or agreeable. He argues that Aquinas’s position is that both sinful and
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A second limitation is related to the first. The ambiguous nature of these infused
inclinations is only compounded by Aquinas’s metaphysics of form by which he
articulates created habitual grace as a principle or form for supernatural action. 81 Aquinas
extends this understanding of habitual grace to the theological virtues, the infused
cardinal virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit as well. Such virtues or inclinations are
not attained by repetitive actions but are infused into the soul through habitual grace as
forms for supernatural actions. Since they are infused virtues which give believers the
capacity to act supernaturally, believers cannot act out of such inclinations on their own.
After all, the only one who could reduce a supernatural form to action is a supernatural
being, namely the Holy Spirit. Thus, the Spirit’s auxilia are also required so that humans
act out of their new supernatural inclinations.
The problem with all of this is that it is not clear how these infused virtues are
virtues at all. They are not acquired by human actions, nor do they directly help humans
act (other than in providing the potential for such actions) since the auxiliary graces take
care of the volitional elements of human action. 82 In the operative function of the infused
virtues, they heal human nature, 83 but Aquinas does not give us a strong sense of what
this healing process might entail and how it is different from the healing we might expect

divine-like tendencies operate at the same time, but does not explain how that is the case or how the
virtuous inclinations overcome sinful ones. See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 46.
81. Of course, Aquinas has good reasons for understanding habitual grace as the form for
supernatural action. Since participating in the divine nature lies outside of what humans are able to do
naturally (i.e. according to reason), only God could elevate human nature to participate in the life of God.
82. Of course, providing the capacity for supernatural actions is certainly an important role, and I
by no means intend to make slight of that importance. It just seems like in order to be virtues, there must be
some sort of volitional element that is not reducible to the divine auxilia.
83. ST. IaIIae, Q. 109, A. 2.
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humans to receive naturally from being guided by the Spirit’s auxilia to act more and
more virtuously over time. Admittedly, Aquinas’s metaphysics of form as applied to
habitual grace is necessary for the elevation of human nature to participate in God, but it
also can overshadow the way the theological virtues become rooted in human experience
(not only potentially but actually) by directing human volition towards God so that the
believer can be guided by the Spirit to act. 84 There needs to be a greater sense of how
these two aspects of habitual grace are related as well as how they connect to the Spirit’s
auxiliary grace.
Finally, Aquinas’s account of how the Spirit guides the actions of believers by
indwelling them needs to be clarified with contemporary understandings of human action.
Aquinas only describes auxiliary grace as the Spirit moving the will to act, but it isn’t
clear what goes into this process, especially since the current literature in the philosophy
of action often explains actions by the volitional mental states (beliefs, desires,
intentions) that lead to them rather than by some executive act of will. 85 What is needed
for Aquinas’s account of the indwelling to become a truly contemporary account is a
greater sense of how Aquinas’s vast vision for the life guided by the Spirit touches upon
the way human action actually works on the volitional level (including the various mental

84. Another way of saying this might be that there seems to be implied (though not developed) a
sense of development concerning how the infused virtues become actualized in the will. Humans cooperate
with God in supernatural actions, but such actions also seem to increase or intensify the infused virtues in
terms of their rootedness in the will. One might have infinite potential to become loving, but not yet be a
loving person. Yet, it seems like over time one grows (actually, not only potentially) in becoming a loving
person, rather than just one who performs loving actions. It is this sense of growth between doing some
supernatural actions by the divine auxilia and becoming a more God-like person that I think needs greater
articulation and development, though it is of course possible that Aquinas’s account presumes such
development.
85. For this language in Aquinas, see SCG. 4, 22, 6.
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states that are necessary for actions) from baptism onward. It is to this constructive
possibility that I now turn.

CHAPTER III
THE SPIRIT’S INDWELLING AND THE INTENTIONALITY OF BELIEVERS
Introduction
In this chapter, I argue that, by indwelling believers, the Spirit redirects the
intentionality of believers towards union with God. By understanding intentions and how
they lead to intentional actions, we can make greater sense not only of how habitual and
auxiliary grace work together to draw believers towards God but also of the way in which
the Spirit’s guidance over the believer’s life is a developmental process. Such redirection
of intentionality begins with the Spirit redirecting human intention in general (habitual
grace) towards union with God, but the Spirit gradually guides believers to intend more
and more particular actions (auxiliary grace) that contribute to their spiritual progress.
The chapter will synthesize the previous chapter’s account of how the Spirit guides the
actions of believers by indwelling them with insights from contemporary philosophy of
intention.
My argument is not that this is the only way in which the Spirit enters into human
action, nor am I offering a full theory of how the Spirit enters into human action. It
simply explores one way to make sense of how the Spirit guides believers to act by
indwelling them. First, I will offer an account that makes sense of intentions as mental
states, entailing certain relevant beliefs and desires, that perform an executive function
over actions. Such a function is observable in that when a person intends to do
something, he or she usually does the intended action unless some incompatible belief or
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desire gets in the way. Second, I will use this account of intention to articulate the
function of habitual grace. Such grace redirects the intention of believers towards union
with God generally, leading humans consistently to intend to move closer to that end.
Third, I will explain how the Spirit causes particular intentions (and so guides believers
to particular actions) through auxiliary grace. The Spirit illumines the believer to
particular actions that will contribute to her moral progress (and to avoid actions that do
not), and if the believer’s desire to move towards God is stronger than competing desires,
then she will intend that action. Fourth, I will answer two possible objections to the
account developed in the earlier sections.
Intention and Intentional Action
An intention is a mental state that is fundamental to human agency. In explaining
an action, one would normally state that “I intended to bring about the intended state of
affairs by acting in that way.” Intuitively, such intending entails a certain commitment to
bringing about the state of affairs that usually results in one acting in the intended way.
However, intending not only seems to be associated with actions but to play some causal
role in producing them. And if intentions play such an important causal role in human
action generally, then it is important to gain a better understanding of what intentions are
and how they work if we are to understand what role the redirection of the intentionality
of believers by the Spirit might play in terms of their acting in ways that contribute to
their ultimate end. After all, if the Spirit guides believers in the spiritual life, then the
Spirit must be involved in their intentions to some degree. In this causal role, intentions
also seem to be inextricably tied to the believer’s beliefs and desires since one often
explains why he or she did a certain thing by stating a certain belief or desire. As a result,
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any viable account of intention must take seriously both of these aspects: 1) intentions are
inextricably connected to an agent’s beliefs and desires and 2) intentions have some
causal role in producing actions.
We will thus proceed by first considering what intending entails before exploring
what sort of causal role intentions have in producing intentional actions. Generally, there
are two distinct types of intentions, namely proximal intentions and distal intentions. The
difference between these categories comes down to how much time elapses and how
many actions (and corresponding intentions) must take place between the initial intention
and the intended state of affairs. In a proximal intention, there will be a small amount of
time or no time elapsed between the intention to act in a certain way and the action itself
by which a person intends to bring about a certain state of affairs. 1 For example, if I
intend to bring about the state of affairs ‘turn on the light,’ by the action ‘moving my
finger against the light switch,’ there would typically be little time that elapsed between
my intention and my moving my hand.
Proximal intentions can also include examples in which many descriptors are
possible at once for the same action. Anscombe uses the example of a serial killer who
moves his arm, operates a pump, and replenishes the water supply (his job, but he does it
with poisonous water) for a family with the intention of killing the inhabitants. 2 In this
case, although one can describe the action in a variety of ways, the intended state of
affairs and the action by which the man brought about that state of affairs happen all at

1. For this definition of proximal intentions, see Alfred Mele, Springs of Action: Understanding
Intentional Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 144-45. Mele argues that the primary
difference between the two types of intentions is time. Proximal intentions are intentions for the immediate
future.
2. See G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000), 46-47.
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once. 3 The person intends either now or very soon to perform the action. Thus, the
intention, although complex, is still a proximal intention since very little time has elapsed
between having the intention, doing the necessary action, and bringing about the state of
affairs, and it only took one action to bring about the state of affairs. 4
A distal intention, on the other hand, is an intention for a state of affairs in the
future for which there may be many necessary actions and much elapsed time between
the initial intending, the action or actions that will bring about the intended state of
affairs, and the state of affairs itself. 5 For example, I might tell a friend that I intend to go
to a theology conference in England in a year’s time. Let’s say that at the time I do not
have enough money to go to the conference, and I will need to work overtime at my job
each week in order to have enough money to be able to go. Time would elapse between
my initial intention, each required action (and thus each required intention) for bringing
about the state of affairs (such as working, saving, buying the plane ticket, traveling, etc.)
and the state of affairs itself (going to the conference). Of course, the logic of distal
intentions is that eventually such intentions will eventually become proximal intentions. 6
Although I now have a distal intention to go to the conference, eventually it will be time
to go and I will be in position to say, “I now intend to go to the conference.”

3. This perspective on intentional action, where there can be many descriptors for a single action,
is the coarse-grained view of actions. See Robert Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993), 2.
4. Of course, in such a scenario, it could be that the action was premeditated in which case the
intention was a distal intention to do the action. However, in the moment of the action, the intention is
proximal since it is for an action now rather than in the future.
5. See Mele, Springs of Action, 145.
6. See Ibid.
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Despite the way in which distal and proximal intentions are distinct, they share
what is fundamental to one intending a certain action, namely that the action have a
certain connection to one’s beliefs and desires. Robert Audi’s account of intention is
important for capturing this connection since it explains the relevant beliefs and desires
as two conditions that are constitutive of a person P successfully saying that she intends
to bring about a state of affairs S by Aing. 7 Audi’s first necessary condition for having an
intention is a belief in the probability that one will bring about that state of affairs by
acting in some way. 8 When P intends to bring about S by action A, it seems at least
initially plausible that one would have to believe that it is likely that she will bring about
S by A. She does not have to know for certain that she will bring about S by A, but she
must believe it likely or probable. Otherwise, she merely hopes for the state of affairs to
come about as opposed to intending them. If I intend to go to the movies, but believe that
it is unlikely that I will get there, then I only hope I will make it. 9 I might recognize that it
is possible that I might go, but I would not be willing to bet my money on that state of
affairs actually coming about.
Audi’s distinction between merely hoping and intending S by Aing seems to make
sense of the common usage of the word intend. When I say I intend to do something,
there is an expectation that I will bring about S by Aing. I might go so far as to describe
my belief as confidence in the likelihood that I will be able to bring it about: confidence
not only in the possibility of me bringing about S by Aing but also of the probability that

7. Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason, 56-73.
8. Ibid., 56-57.
9. Ibid., 57.
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I will do it. Going back to the theology conference example, I could not truthfully say
that “I intend to go to the conference in a year” if I believed that there was no chance of
my going due to financial reasons. I might hope to win the lottery or some distant relative
might die and leave me a large sum of money, but I would still not be intending to go to
the conference. I must be confident that I will be able to go in order to have an intention
to bring it about. Of course many things might come up that would prevent me from
going, but at that time, the belief that it is probable that I go is necessary for me to say I
intend to go. 10
Audi’s second condition for having an intention is a desire or want condition. 11
Unlike the belief condition, which is a more common assumption among philosophers of
action, desire is more complicated since there are many instances in which I might intend
to do something that I do not want to do such as taking out the trash in order to make my
house clean, driving to the grocery store after work so I will have food, and doing my
taxes to avoid prison/fines. Audi’s response to this complexity is to divide up the desires
that are relevant for intention into intrinsic and extrinsic desires. 12 The former entails
intending S for its own sake, and the latter entails intending S for the sake of acquiring
some other good that one deems intrinsic. In my theology conference example, I might
completely dislike my job, making overtime an undesirable task. In fact, intrinsically,

10. This example has been of a complex intention. In simple intentions, belief in the likelihood of
bringing about S will be even stronger since there will be less time between one’s doing the action and the
intended state of affairs. Plus, in many examples of simple intentions, there is not even that much time
between the intention and the completion of the action. In complex intentions, one might still believe in the
likelihood in bringing about S, but the belief will not be as strong as it would be in a simple intention.
11. Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason, 58. Here, I (and Audi) am thinking of desires and wants
as synonymous mental states.
12. Ibid., 59.
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there might be any number of activities I would rather do than go to work. However, this
work and pay may be considered an extrinsic desire since I desire it for fulfilling some
intrinsic desire, namely going to the conference, which overrides the other intrinsic
desires I have in this moment.
By desiring S (either intrinsically or extrinsically), Audi means something like
Anscombe who argues that “the primitive sign of wanting (desiring) is trying to get” in
which one knows that the object of desire is there, and there is a volitional movement
towards it. 13 Anscombe does not mean that one must actually do the action for it to count
as an intention-related desire; though it would be strange if one really desired something
and did nothing to try to get it. “Trying to get” in terms of intending S by Aing means
being disposed to “try to get.” It is a kind of motivation or “pro-attitude” to try to bring
about S that would include examples in which I intend the action but do not desire to do it
intrinsically. Such intention-relevant desire entails desiring to lose weight with the
motivation to try rather than desiring to lose weight with no motivation to join or go to a
gym. Simple “desiring” may appear completely disconnected to my actually doing the
action, but if desiring entails a sort of trying-to-get disposition, then desiring to bring
about S might be closer to doing the action than initially thought.
Once one has this belief/desire combination towards S, one can properly say that
she intends to bring it about, but it is unclear how this intention alone is connected to
bringing about the state of affairs. Put another way, what actually causes the action after
one has intended to do it? Philosophers of action are divided on what actually causes an

13. See Anscombe, Intention, 68-69.
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intentional act. 14 Many philosophers, following Davidson, have argued that reasons
explanations are causal explanations; the cause of the act is whatever reason a person
gives for why they did the act (usually a combination of desires, beliefs, intentions,
etc.). 15 There has been much controversy over this position since it is not clear that
having an intention, belief, or desire necessarily produces actions. When I intend to do
something, there is no guarantee that I will do the action since any number of things
could happen to produce desires or beliefs that are incompatible with the desires or
beliefs that are necessary for having the intention. Moreover, there are many examples of
cases in which one has the necessary intention (including the necessary beliefs and
desires) and performs the action that was initially intended though there is some other
event that actually causes the action (so-called deviant causal chain scenarios). 16
Alternatively, volitionalists argue that some executive act of willing causes the
action after one has an intention to act in that way. After one intends to bring about a
state of affairs and reasons about the best way to bring it about, one must then will to act.
The difficulty with this perspective is that such an act of will is often understood as an

14. For the variety of options, see Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason, 1-31, and Kieran Setiya,
“Intention,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/. See
also George Wilson and Samuel Shpall, “Action,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/. These are general sources I consulted in order to get a couple of the
mainstream options. A future paper will hopefully begin to explore this aspect of intention and action
theory more deeply, but that would be too much to fit into the present thesis.
15. See Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” reprinted in Essays on Actions and
Events (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3-20. For a discussion and response to Davidson’s
main argument, see Ernest LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin, “Actions, Reasons, Causes, and Intentions,”
in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lepore and McLaughlin
(New York: Blackwell, 1985), 1-13.
16. For example, let’s say “Betty intends to kill someone, but when she aims her gun a noise
startles her, leading her finger to contract so that she shoots and kills the person, though not intentionally.
In cases like this one, although she intends to kill someone, a deviant causal chain complicates the picture.
This is a scenario from Gilbert Harman, “Practical Reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics 29 (1976): 445.
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action over which one has conscious control. 17 So, if one has an intention to A, that
person must oversee the entire process by which the bodily mechanisms execute the
intended action. Such willing is something added in addition to the relevant beliefs,
desires, and intentions. Indeed, it is unclear in such accounts what role intentions actually
play in performing corresponding intentional actions. In light of these difficulties, there is
no consensus concerning the particular causal mechanisms that produce intentional
actions when one has an intention to act in that way. However, just because we do not
have all the causal factors accounted for does not mean that we cannot understand
intentions as having an important causal role in producing intentional actions. 18
One promising line of inquiry that seeks to carve out such a causal role of
intentions is that proposed (in different ways) by Michael Bratman and Alfred Mele. Both
writers understand intentions as executive states (in their role as conduct-controllers) that
have a “characteristic inertia” towards one’s acting in the intended way. 19 When one
intends to perform an action, this intention entails being settled on the action, meaning
that one decides or plans to act in that way. 20 This distinguishes intention from mere
passional or emotional desiring in which one can desire to act in some way but decide

17. For an example of this perspective, see Hugh J. McCann, “Volition and Basic Action,”
Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 470. For a discussion of the faults of this view, see Audi, Action,
Intention, and Reason, 78. Another philosopher who shares this perspective is Jing Zhu, “Intention and
Volition,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2004): 175-93.
18. For the sake of this project, I will remain agnostic about all the various causal mechanisms
behind actions. There is not enough space for a significant treatment here, though this could certainly be an
area for future work.
19. See Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987), 22; and Mele, Springs of Action, 192. I group these two writers together because although
there are some differences in their accounts of intention, they are in total agreement on the topics of
relevance here.
20. See Mele, Springs of Action, 142-45.
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against it later. 21 If the intention is proximal, then the intention will usually result in the
execution of the action. In fact, Mele argues that acquiring an intention “triggers the
appropriate actional mechanisms that lead to intentional actions.” 22 Similarly, when one
acquires a distal intention for some future state of affairs, the intention will also trigger
the relevant actional mechanisms so long as the intention survives until the relevant
future time.
By arguing that intentions trigger the appropriate actional mechanisms, these
writers do not come down on any single understanding of what all of those mechanisms
are or how they then cause the action; rather, what they argue is that intentions play an
important role in getting the processes started and in some ways motivating their
successful completion, whether proximally or distally. In seeing intentions as having this
executive function over human action, however, both Bratman and Mele argue against
the desire-belief model of intention, which understands intentions as desire/belief
complexes. In fact, they argue that ultimately intentions are distinctive mental states that
do not require desires or beliefs at all. They might work in tandem with beliefs and
desires, but such states cannot be understood as necessary conditions for having an
intention as I argued above.
Against the desire condition of an intention, Mele raises the example of an
agoraphobic woman whose fear of open spaces might be so strong that her desire to avoid
traveling outweighs her desire to go to her son’s wedding. 23 However, she might still

21. For a survey of the types of desire relevant to motivating actions, see Robert Audi, “Intending,
Intentional Action, and Desire,” in Joel Marks, ed., The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical
Psychology on the Concept of Wanting (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1986), 21.
22. See Mele, Springs of Action, 180-81.
23. See Ibid., 142; Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical, 18-19.
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intend to go to the wedding, and this intention might still lead to her going despite her
paralyzing fear of open spaces. In this case, her predominant desire actually points in the
opposite direction of what she intends or decides to do. Thus, the intention is
disconnected from her desires. For Mele and Bratman, cases in which one desires to act
in some way but ends up intending and thus deciding on another course of action point
against making desire for an action a necessary condition for intending it.
Against the belief condition, the writers argue that requiring the belief that one
will probably do a certain action is too rigorous a demand for one intending an action. If
one wants to avoid smoking but believes from past experience that she probably will
smoke but then succeeds in resisting this tendency, it seems like the person still intended
to avoid smoking, rendering the belief requirement unnecessary to intending. 24 They also
argue that even in addition to the desire condition, the belief that one will perform some
action does not fulfill the executive/conduct-controlling function that makes intention
distinctive and important for human actions. Bratman raises the example that he might
desire to go to Tanner Library and may indeed believe that he will go because of this
motivation. He asks, “could I nevertheless continue to be disposed to deliberate about
whether to take the afternoon off?” 25 He questions whether he is really settled on this
matter, and if he is not so settled, then he does not really intend to go to Tanner.
Despite their clarification and explanation of the executive function of intentions,
both writers misunderstand the belief/desire model as developed by Robert Audi. When it
comes to the desire condition, Bratman and Mele assume that the kind of desire that is

24. This example is found in Mele, Springs of Action, 157-58.
25. See Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical, 19.
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relevant to intention on the desire/belief model is strictly a passion or emotional type of
desire. However, as Audi has argued, there are many types of desires/wants, and these
two types are not even the most relevant ways of desiring for intentions. Intending some
end can include these desires, but even in cases when one decides to do something she
does not want to do intrinsically, she still desires to do it extrinsically, for some other
intrinsically desired end. By distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic desires, Audi
effectively undermines Mele’s separation between intentions and desires. Every instance
of intention is also an instance of desire, whether intrinsic or extrinsic.
In a similar vein, the objection against the belief condition also misses some key
distinctions that desire/belief theorists like Audi make. In the example of the woman with
the smoking habit, Mele argues that she intends to avoid smoking despite believing that
she might not be able to do it. However, there are two types of intentions that are being
discussed, namely intending to A and intending to try to A. We could say that although
the woman does not intend to A because of the belief requirement, she does intend to try
to avoid smoking. Moreover, even if one does not accept this distinction, it is strange to
say that one intends to do some action but will not do it or probably will not do it. Indeed,
even in thinking about intention as “being settled,” it seems like some belief requirement
at the very least would be implied in this settledness. One does not always have to
consciously think about this belief for one to have it; instead one can have a tacit belief
such that when questioned whether she will A, she would answer in the affirmative.
The second objection to the belief condition is really an objection to the whole
desire/belief account: that it cannot fulfill the executive role that intentions seem to play
in human intentional action. As I have already noted, I think this executive function of
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intentions is an important one since it helps bridge the gap between intentions and
intentional action. However, is this executive function necessarily antithetical to the
desire/belief model? I do not think so. Going back to my conference example from
earlier, if I want to go to the conference (and there are no stronger antithetical desires)
and I believe that I will go (or probably will go) to the conference, then it seems like the
issue is settled for me unless either condition is undermined (either a competing desire or
I stop believing that I will be able to go to the conference). Mele might respond that it is
not settled if the intention can be so undermined, but even on Mele and Bratman’s
accounts, an intention or decision is revocable; one can reopen the case of whether to act
in a certain way, so it seems like there is no real tension between the two accounts.
Ultimately, whether explaining a proximal or distal intention, there is no reason
the two accounts cannot cohere for a more complete understanding that can capture both
the nature and the function of intentions. We can understand intentions as necessarily
entailing that one desires or wants to perform the action as well as believe that she will
successfully complete the action. When one so intends a particular end or action, this
intention will perform an executive role over our actions. In a proximal intention, it will
trigger the action-related mechanisms to begin, and a distal intention will do the same so
long as no antithetical desires or beliefs undermine it. Having an intention to act thus
places a person in the best possible position for doing the act.
The Indwelling, Habitual Grace, and Intention
The theological relevance of the previously discussed account is not that it brings
together two opposing positions on the nature and function of intentions (though the
account certainly tries to do this) but that it provides action-related concepts that are
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helpful for articulating the influence of the Spirit’s indwelling on the actions of believers.
In fact, the account is able to help in this way while also cohering with Aquinas’s account
of the indwelling from chapter 2 and providing some ways for understanding both the
interdependence of habitual and actual grace as well as how the believer gradually
develops towards union with God. The point is not that Aquinas was employing such
philosophical tools but that they are certainly compatible with what Aquinas describes
concerning the indwelling of the Spirit and grace (both habitual and auxiliary).
In habitual grace, the Spirit’s indwelling presence as the unitive Love, shared by
Father and Son, leaves an imprint of that same love on the soul of the believer. Although
this habitual gift is most aptly understood as created love, it also includes all of the other
infused dispositions that guide the believer towards beatitude, including the theological
virtues, the infused cardinal virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 26 Such dispositions
are infused all at once when the Spirit indwells believers, though they only give believers
the potential or capacity for supernatural action. 27 Thus, we should not understand the
infusion of these dispositions as immediately changing the volitional attunement of the
believer towards beatitude, but these dispositions do enable the possibility for that radical
transformation. After all, the capacity/potency for participation in the Love of God is a
necessary component of humans achieving their ultimate end in union with the God who
they love.

26. See John Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in
Eternal Law (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2009), 154-56.
27. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 110, A. 2. Aquinas says, “All the more, then, does he infuse supernatural
forms or qualities into those whom he moves towards obtaining an eternal, supernatural good, whereby
they may be moved by him.” Then, in the Ad primum, he says, “Grace in the sense of a quality is said to act
on the soul not in the manner of an efficient cause but in the manner of a formal cause.”
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In addition to this important metaphysical role, however, habitual grace also has
an actualized component through these infused virtues. Such virtues are not actualized by
themselves since they are capacities for volitional transformation and do not entail that
such transformation is realized. Alternatively, they are actualized insofar as the Spirit’s
auxiliary grace reduces such capacities to act, enabling them to become firmly rooted in
the believer’s nature such that it becomes more natural for the believer to act out of such
dispositions with the Spirit’s assistance. 28 To understand this rooted aspect of the infused
virtues, one must understand the distinction between potency and the actualization of that
potency. Upon baptism, one has all of the potencies for supernatural action (including the
theological virtues), but such potencies have not yet become a part of the believer’s
nature. In other words, the believer has not yet become fully transformed; he or she has
the capacity for divine-likeness, but has not yet become a divine-like person.
Thus, in addition to being merely potentially transformative habits, faith, hope,
and love (and the other infused virtues) also become “operational habits,” which direct
humans towards their ultimate end in union with God. 29 It is comparable to a situation in
which one needs to cross a long bridge to move from one location to another. One has the
capacity to enter onto the bridge, but it is only when one begins to walk through the
entrance that real progress is made in one’s moving towards the other location. In this
example, the theological virtues are like one’s capacity to walk to the other side (after all,
one can walk and the entrance is there), but one must actually walk (act out of such

28. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 109, A. 1; ST. IaIIae, Q. 109, A. 9, Ad. 2.
29. This is at least the way Healy describes these supernatural dispositions in the Summa
Theologica. See Nicholas M. Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2003), 119.
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dispositions) in order for spiritual progress to be made. In terms of our account of
intention above, these theological virtues correspond to the two necessary conditions of
having an intention with faith meeting the cognitive condition and hope and love meeting
the desire condition. As a result, by the gradual actualization of the theological virtues,
the Spirit redirects the intentionality of believers in a general way towards union with
God.
Faith, being the first theological virtue to be actualized, can be conceived either as
an act (before baptism) or as a gradually infused habit (resulting from the presence of
habitual grace in the soul), both of which are caused by the Holy Spirit. 30 As the Spirit’s
act upon humans before baptism, faith is the human assent to or belief in those
propositions that God has revealed. 31 Such assent to the propositions of faith does not
happen by human will alone. 32 Rather, as one reads Scripture, hears a sermon, or receives
the content of divine revelation through some other medium, the Spirit works in and
through the natural human cognitive/doxastic processes in order to cause one to believe
that these relevant propositions are true. 33 Among these propositions, one believes that 1)

30. See Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 158. For faith as an act, see ST. IIaIIae, Q. 6, A. 2. For
faith as a infused virtue, see ST. IIaIIae, Q. 4, Art. 5. As an act, faith is an example of auxiliary grace, but
the point is that even as an infused virtue, faith also has a continual auxiliary dimension.
31. For Aquinas, intellectual assent involves both an act of the intellect as well as the will. The
will must command the intellect to assent to the proposition, a position that would probably not fit too
easily with current externalist/reliabilist epistemologies.
32. This does not mean that the will is uninvolved in one’s coming to faith. Indeed, one must at
the very least be willing to assent to the propositions of faith. One certainly will not come to faith if one is
totally closed off to it. See Bruce Marshall, Trinity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 210-11. We might call this a type of minimalistic openness to belief in the articles of faith. For a
perspective along these lines, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 389-404. Stump
argues that humans can become quiescent to the movement of the Holy Spirit, meaning they become
neutral, neither closed off to saving faith nor in pursuit of it.
33. By this, I mean that Christians usually find themselves believing in the propositions of faith
without having all the reasons in place. Instead, when they hear a sermon, read a text of Scripture, or speak
with a friend, the Spirit enters into these cognitive processes to bring them to belief. This is my attempt to
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union with God is the proper end of humanity, 2) “it is possible to attain eternal life
(union with God), and 3) divine help has been prepared for us to this end,” all of which
are necessary beliefs for intending union with God. 34 Having an intention requires that
one believe that it is probable that one will bring about the state of affairs, and this is
exactly what the Spirit causes humans to believe: that they can grow towards union with
God with the Spirit’s assistance.
As a habit, faith properly disposes one to continue holding these Spirit-formed
beliefs. Although the act of faith entails initially believing in the propositions of
revelation, the Spirit’s infusion of the habit of faith goes a step further, ensuring that “the
intellect should be in the way of truth at all times,” since the Spirit sustains those beliefs
throughout one’s life. 35 The Spirit is able to sustain such knowledge of the spiritual life
by shedding greater light on the propositions believed (thus enabling one to connect the
propositions of revelation with other aspects of one’s life) and providing experiential
evidence for their truth, further convincing the believer of their validity. 36 Both of these
functions lead the believer to greater levels of spiritual understanding.

make sense of Aquinas on this point while remaining true to contemporary externalist epistemology, which
argues that one can have knowledge of something without having access to all the evidence for the relevant
belief. For examples of this sort of understanding of the Spirit’s epistemic role, see Alvin Plantinga,
Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 241-88; William Abraham, Crossing
the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 58-78.
34. See ST. IIaIIae, Q. 17, A. 8. By divine help, I mean any number of ways in which the Spirit
might be working in human action, especially ways we might describe as more providential in nature. The
account of the Spirit’s role in human action is merely one proposal for understanding the Spirit’s entering
into human action. It in no way pretends to be the only way. For these particular beliefs, see also ST.
IIaIIae, Q. 17, A. 7.
35. ST. IIaIIae, Q. 4, A. 5.
36. What I call “shedding light” Aquinas calls the gift of understanding. See ST. IIaIIae, Q. 9, A.
1. When it comes to providing evidence, such experiential evidence could be some sort of mystical
encounter like that described by William Alston in Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious
Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 9-34, or a gradual growing awareness of God’s
presence in one’s life such as that found in Sarah Coakley, “Dark Contemplation and Epistemic
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Accordingly, such faith entails a process of epistemic growth in which the
intellect is gradually elevated towards the beatific vision (perceiving God as God actually
is) with the help of the theological virtues hope and love. 37 As we grow in our loving
union with God through hope and love, we come to know and understand God and our
relationship to God ever more deeply, just as a husband comes to know his wife more
deeply as their bond of love grows in marriage. Such knowledge only becomes more
firmly rooted as one experiences that person more and more. Thus, the Spirit not only
causes one to believe that it is possible to reach union with God and have confidence that
she will bring it about with the Spirit’s assistance; the Spirit also seeks to further instill
such faith throughout one’s life, ensuring that she will continue to hold these intentionrelevant beliefs.
After the Spirit causes and begins to sustain the beliefs that union with God is
one’s greatest good and that it is possible to reach this arduous good with the Spirit’s
assistance, the Spirit then begins to actualize the theological virtue of hope in the
Christian. 38 For Aquinas, hope is the movement of one’s desires towards an arduous good
that is difficult but possible to obtain (in this case union with God made possible through
the Spirit’s assistance). 39 The Spirit actualizes this theological virtue by initially directing

Transformation: The Analytic Theologian Re-Meets Theresa of Avila,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays
in the Philosophy of Theology, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 304-5.
37. For understanding faith as a process of epistemic growth towards the beatific vision, see the
discussion in Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 159. See also ST. Suppl. Q. 92, A. 1. The Supplement is
the part of the Summa compiled after Aquinas’s death from his Commentary of the Sentences of Peter
Lombard. His largest discussion of the beatific vision is found only in the Supplement.
38. ST. IIaIIae, Q. 17, A. 7.
39. ST. IIaIIae, Q. 17, A 1.
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and gradually intensifying one’s desire for eternal blessedness or union with God over
and above one’s sinful desires. 40 Humans naturally already desire blessedness or
happiness in general, but they pursue this end by a variety of means that are actually
antithetical to human flourishing. 41 As a result, the Spirit must direct the believer’s
natural desire for happiness towards union with God (humanity’s proper supernatural
end) through the virtue of faith. Faith specifies the goal towards which one ought to be
moving in order to reach true happiness, but there are still many sinful desires that
compete with this initial desire for union with God, preventing Christians from acting in
accord with this desire. 42 The Spirit thus also gradually intensifies the believer’s desire
for God above and beyond these other desires, enabling humans to overcome them and
act in ways that contribute towards their proper end. 43
In recognizing this important connection between acting towards the arduous
good of union with God and desire, I am pointing towards Anscombe’s notion of desire
as a “trying to get” disposition. 44 When one’s desire has been intensified to try to reach
union with God, she is motivated to try to reach it by whatever means are available.

40. Although this understanding of the infusion of hope is not incompatible with Aquinas’s
account, what I am offering goes beyond what Aquinas says about how hope works. All Aquinas
recognizes is that hope is the movement of one’s desires towards some arduous good. See ST. IIaIIae, Q.
17, A. 3.
41. See again the various examples in ST. IaIIae, Q. 2.
42. At least, this is my understanding of the sinful state of humanity.
43. In this way, my work is very similar to that of Lonergan. See Jeremy Wilkins, “Grace and
Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and the Problematic of Habitual Grace,” Theological Studies 72 (2011): 72349. According to Wilkins, Lonergan makes sense of habitual grace’s healing function as that of
development of one’s psychological states. My account makes sense of it in light of gradual intensification
of action relevant desire. The difference appears to be in the philosophical resources we are using, though
there is no incompatibility here.
44. See Anscombe, Intention, 68. Of course, the actual trying itself is facilitated by the Spirit’s
auxiliary grace since it is such grace that actualizes hope as a potency in the first place.
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Though Christians will initially struggle with their competing desires, the Spirit gradually
increases their desire for union with God as they continually try to move closer towards
this end, and this intensification of desire towards God will in turn heal the human
condition of competing sinful desires. Moreover, desire here is not merely a passion or
emotional desire for union with God; it is a desire guided by what one decides is good for
her. Indeed, there may be times in the struggle against one’s sinful inclinations that a
believer may desire to go back to one’s former way of life. However, in light of Audi’s
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic desires, the believer will remain steadfast in
her pursuit of union with God in particular ways insofar as her desire for this end is
intrinsic, and it ultimately overrides her competing desires.
The desire side of the Spirit’s redirection of the intentionality of believers is only
strengthened by the third theological virtue to be rooted in the will, namely love. As
discussed in the previous chapter, love is best understood both as a participation in the
Holy Spirit who is the Love shared by Father and Son and as the mother of all the virtues,
which reinforces and strengthens them while at the same time being strengthened by
them. Aquinas also describes love as “friendship with God arising from our sharing in
eternal happiness.” 45 However, although our loving God is initially motivated by our
hope for this eternal happiness (i.e., the good we receive from God), love ultimately
strengthens our hope and thus our desire for that blessed end. Aquinas argues that “the
love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in

45. See ST. IIaIIae, Q. 24, A. 2.
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the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved” 46 Thus, as
one grows in love for God, one’s desire to be unified with the object of one’s love
increases more and more.
As a result, even if one’s love for God is initially weak (perhaps the person only
loves God insofar as she loves the benefit of eternal life), over time the person begins to
love God for God’s own sake, and this growing love increases one’s desire for union with
God. Whereas hope provides the basic desire that is relevant to this intention, the Holy
Spirit, through love, is able to further intensify this desire for union with God. In fact, it is
only through the virtue of love that one’s desire to move closer towards union with God
is able to overcome alternative sinful desires on a consistent basis because such desires
are rooted in something superior, namely a participation in the Spirit’s love.
The most important way in which believers are able grow in the theological virtue
of love is through the sacrament of the Eucharist since the Spirit gives to believers the
benefits of Christ’s perfect love (the love of Christ’s passion) through their partaking of
the bread and wine. Concerning this sacrament, Aquinas says, “the Eucharist is called
‘the sacrament of charity,’ which is the ‘bond of perfection,’ as it says in Col. 3:14.” 47
Moreover, since the love by which Christ loved all humanity in his passion is the Holy
Spirit, the love (charity) the believer receives in the Eucharist is the very love that the
Spirit bestows as an initially weak tendency by indwelling her. Thus, although the
believer receives love by the Spirit’s indwelling her at baptism and begins to grow in love

46. ST. IaIIae, Q. 66, A. 6. For an excellent discussion of how Aquinas understands the way love
increases our desire to be unified with the object of our love, see Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness:
Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 91-100.
47. ST. IIIa, Q. 73, A. 3, ad. 3. See also discussion in Daria Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace:
Deification According to St. Thomas Aquinas (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2015), 317.
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through loving acts, participating in the Eucharist increases one’s love to such an extent
that the believer’s love “is furthermore aroused to act, according to 2 Cor 5:14: ‘the
charity of Christ urges us.’” 48 The Eucharist is thus indispensable for one’s growth in
love, which inevitably increases one’s desire for union with God as well as one’s faith in
the possibility of that realization with the Spirit’s assistance. Through these discussions
of faith, hope, and love, we can see that the theological virtues are mutually enriching
tendencies that, when they gradually become rooted in the believer, work together in
drawing the believer towards God.
In accordance with their respective functions, faith, hope, and love redirect human
intention generally towards union with God by forming a meta-intention. By metaintention, I merely mean an intention for an eternal state of affairs that guides one’s
actions over the course of one’s life. 49 The meta-intention for union with God is not
merely a simple distal intention for something I want in the future like intending to go to
a conference in a year, though intending the ultimate end of our existence is indeed a type
of distal intention. Moreover, this meta-intention is not for something that one will
accomplish on one’s own if he or she merely acts in all the right ways. To the contrary,
the fulfillment of this intention is largely God’s prerogative.
Despite these complexities, however, thinking of the theological virtues as
forming a meta-intention for union with God that directs one’s life as if on a journey
toward beatitude does make sense of the role they seem to play in the life guided by the

48. ST. IIIa, Q. 79, A. 1, ad. 2; Spezzano, Glory of God’s Grace, 320.
49. By articulating the theological virtues as a meta-intention, I am trying to make sense of how
such virtues form what Lonergan called a “permanent change in the inclination or a spontaneous orientation
of the will.” See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas
Aquinas (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 55.
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Spirit. When a believer initially becomes a Christian and receives the Holy Spirit, she
intends union with God as the ultimate end/state of affairs for her entire life. She believes
that this is her proper end and that she can achieve this end with the Spirit’s assistance,
and she desires that end to a great extent. Such an intention will also lead her to be
conscious of her actions, whether they contribute to or detract from her ultimate end.
However, it is also true about baptism that one does not become perfect as soon as one
comes out of the water. Appropriately, then, the theological virtues become rooted in the
believer as initially weak (though certainly not insignificant) tendencies that only develop
over time, as one lives in accordance with the Spirit by growing in love.
Normally, when one has a distal intention, one immediately begins to conceive of
various actions that are means toward that intended state of affairs in the future. Then,
when it is time for one to fulfill those extrinsically desired actions, one’s intention
becomes proximal and thus triggers the action-related mechanisms. This process then
repeats until the intended state of affairs that is intrinsic for the person is fulfilled. In the
case of the believer’s meta-intention for union with God, however, there are two
difficulties that especially obstruct the fulfillment of this intention. First, sinful desires
would problematize the fulfillment of such an intention for union with God, especially if
one conceives the human condition as entailing competing desires. 50 In intending union
with God, then, it is likely that one would have many conflicting desires that would get in
the way of one’s pursuit of union with God, not to mention the sinful dispositions one has

50. A great example of this understanding of sin is in Ian McFarland, In Adam’s Fall: A
Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (West Sussex: Blackwell, 2010), 144-61. I shall
merely take this as a given. I will not try to develop an account of how this condition arose or whether
humans receive it at birth. I merely recognize, like McFarland’s discussion of Maximus the Confessor, that
humans mysteriously are drawn towards sin from the moment of their coming into existence.
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formed over time as a result of those desires. 51 Second, there is the issue of ignorance
about the proper means toward that end. Upon baptism, the believer does not know how
to act in accordance with one’s meta-intention in every given circumstance, nor does one
regulate one’s thoughts and actions constantly. Potentially, there could be states of
affairs, desires and the like, that get in the way of one’s growing towards union with God,
especially since such a meta-intention is for some state of affairs in the eschatological
future with no sense of when it will come about. With such difficulties of the human
condition as givens, the Spirit must also guide the actions of believers in a more direct
capacity, namely through auxiliary grace. 52
Auxiliary Grace, Intentions, and Spiritual Development
By means of the divine auxilia, the Spirit not only guides the actions of believers
in a general way towards union with God (by actualizing the theological virtues as
initially weak tendencies) but also guides believers to act in particular ways that
contribute to their ultimate end. In its operative function, auxiliary grace is God’s internal
movement of the human will towards a particular action. God is the mover, and the will is
ultimately passive towards God’s movement, especially in a case in which the believer
who “before had willed evil begins to will the good.” 53 As a result of this direct operation
of God on the will, moving it to will some particular action, God then cooperates in the

51. In the words of Anscombe, one would be “trying to get” many different ends, some that are
not in competition with union with God and some that are.
52. Of course, this is in addition to the way auxiliary grace is needed to move the capacity to act.
What I am describing here is the volitional necessity of such grace. Humans do not start from a place of
virtuous formation and then just add on the ability to participate in the Holy Spirit. Rather, humans start the
spiritual journey as those formed within a world of sin. Thus, auxiliary grace is both a metaphysical and a
volitional necessity.
53. ST. IaIIae, Q. 3, A. 2.
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completion of the action since the action is external and is largely due to the prior
movement of the will. God cooperates “by confirming the will within so that it might
achieve its act and by providing the means of action without.” 54
In both operative and cooperative capacities, auxiliary grace, being most directly
connected to the internal mental states that produce actions, is easily articulated in terms
of my account of intention. In auxiliary grace, there is both the internal movement of the
will that God produces directly and the external activity that God produces indirectly.
The internal, direct movement of the Spirit can easily be understood as a proximal
intention to do some action or to bring about some state of affairs by acting in that way.
God moves the will by producing within the mind an intention, including the relevant
desires and beliefs, that performs an executive function over one’s action.
We could also understand the Spirit’s cooperative involvement in the actions of
believers as just this executive function of the intention; when the Spirit produces in the
believer’s mind an intention for some action, the Spirit cooperates in triggering the
action-related mechanisms that work together to produce the intended action, thus placing
the believer in the best possible position for acting in that way. The Spirit has no need to
operate directly within those mechanisms because intentions will naturally trigger those
mechanisms at the time of the intended action. And in cases of auxiliary distal intentions,
such intentions will eventually become proximal intentions that trigger such mechanisms
at the right time so long as no competing desires/beliefs undermine the intention. 55 Thus,

54. ST. IaIIae, Q. 3, A. 2.
55. For this reason, my focus throughout will be on auxiliary proximal intentions since distal
intentions are only future proximal intentions.
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everything that Aquinas conceives auxiliary grace achieving for the believer can be
understood as the Spirit’s producing intentions for particular actions.
One important feature of these intentions is that they must cohere with one’s
meta-intention for union with God. In this way, the relationship between auxiliary
proximal intentions and one’s meta-intention caused by the Spirit’s presence in the soul is
not so different from the relationship between a distal intention and the sometimes
numerous proximal intentions (means) that are necessary for realizing the intended state
of affairs. In the conference example I raised earlier, my distal intention to go to the
conference in a year also led me to intend a variety of actions that need to cohere with my
distal intention in order not to undermine that intention. For example, I need to go to
work each day (coherent proximal intentions) in order to raise enough money to be able
to go to the conference. Similarly, in the case of the believer’s meta-intention for union
with God, there are many actions throughout her life that will either contribute to her
moving closer towards her intended end or will keep her from the realization of her
intention. A crucial part of what the Spirit does in auxiliary grace is guide the believer to
intend actions that will contribute to her meta-intention and to avoid intending actions
that do not cohere with that meta-intention.
The means by which the Spirit fulfills the desire condition of these auxiliary,
proximal (or in some cases distal) intentions is fairly straightforward. As the Love of God
indwelling the soul, the Spirit imparts the created habitual effect which functions not only
as the mode of indwelling but also as the means by which the Spirit infuses the
theological virtues hope and love into the believer. Such virtues, when initially actualized
by auxiliary grace, redirect and begin to intensify one’s desire for union with God.
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Although one’s desire for God is crucial for one’s meta-intention for union with God,
such desire is also connected and necessary for one’s desiring particular ends that
contribute to one’s progress towards union with God. We can see this connection if we
recall that although I do not necessarily desire to go to work, my desire for the intrinsic
state of affairs, namely going to the conference, largely motivates me to work each day,
rendering such desires extrinsic to my intrinsic goal.
Desire works in the same way when it comes to auxiliary intentions. As a result of
my growing love for God (caused by the Spirit’s contact with the soul), I desire union
with God as an intrinsic good worth pursuing. Then upon discovering that such and such
an action will contribute to that end, I will also desire to complete the action, though
extrinsically. It may go against my selfish desires to do the action, but if my desire for
union with God overrides such selfish desires, then I will intend (and will most likely
complete) the relevant action. Whether I intend a particular action that contributes to my
meta-intention is thus largely dependent on whether my desire for union with God
extends to the desire to act in the particular way. Here, the cognitive condition of my
intending the particular action carries even more weight in the intention than the desire
condition since my desire for union with God will only extend to my desire to act in this
particular way if I am convinced that such an action will contribute to my ultimate
intention. If I am unconvinced that it will so contribute, then my desire will not reach out
to the particular action, and I will not do it.
Concerning this cognitive dimension of the Spirit’s auxiliary work (what we
might call the illumining work of the Spirit) in producing intentions for particular actions,
there can be any number of ways in which the Spirit can guide one to believe in the

71
moment that “this is what I now must do” and that “this will contribute to my intention to
move closer towards union with God.” I do not intend here to be exhaustive in my
explanations but only to explore how the Spirit might illumine believers in holding the
beliefs relevant to intending a particular action. One way of thinking about the cognitive
condition of having particular auxiliary intentions is that it arises in a similar way to how
one comes to the beliefs relevant to one’s meta-intention.
In the theological virtue of faith, for example, the Spirit works in and through
human cognitive/doxastic processes and practices in order to guide believers to believe
the relevant things for intending union with God. The Spirit works in such processes and
practices as one reads Scripture, hears a sermon, or learns from some other medium of
divine revelation. I think the Spirit works in a similar way when it comes to guiding the
believer to believe that such and such an action will contribute to one’s growing towards
union with God. Indeed, the Spirit does not need to work in some fantastic way to guide
humans to hold intention-relevant beliefs. 56 Rather, the Spirit only needs to work in and
through the cognitive processes that humans already possess. 57 In particular, the Spirit
might illumine the believer in and through both her perception of the situation to ensure
the correct judgment and one’s memory in order to evoke the action-related information
that is relevant to making a decision about how to act in the given circumstance.

56. By fantastic, I mean the Spirit working in a way that goes above and beyond the cognitive
processes humans already possess, whether one presupposes a spiritual faculty or set of faculties by which
one comes to know the truths of revelation or some other means of coming to knowledge that goes above
and beyond the natural cognitive faculties that humans possess.
57. Such an understanding of the Spirit’s activity is certainly not new. One theologian who
understands this approach as within the spirit of Aquinas is Yves Congar. See especially I Believe in the
Holy Spirit, Vol. 2, trans. David Smith (New York: Herder and Herder, 1983), 114-15; For a helpful
analysis of this idea in Congar, see Elizabeth T. Groppe, Yves Congar’s Theology of the Holy Spirit
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 96.
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As an illustrative example of how the Spirit might work through perception and
memory to bring one to believe that he or she ought to do a particular action, let us
imagine a believer named Bobby. Bobby is a new convert to the Christian faith who has
struggled with greed for many years. However, upon baptism, Bobby received the Holy
Spirit, by whom he not only came to believe in the propositions of revelation in the first
place by reading Scripture with the Spirit’s guidance, learning from teachers, and
participating in the liturgy but also by whom his desires for union with God have
intensified. Bobby would now say that he intends throughout the rest of his life to move
closer towards his ultimate end in union with God. However, as Bobby walks home from
work one day, he sees ahead of him a homeless person sitting on the ground begging for
enough money to get some food.
Bobby approaches the homeless person and the Spirit guides him towards the
belief that the right thing to do in the situation is to give the person some money for a
meal. On the one hand, the Spirit illumines or sheds light on the reality of the situation
for Bobby: a person is in desperate need for money and Bobby has money that he can use
for helping the homeless person. In addition to perceiving the situation correctly,
however, Bobby must also receive guidance concerning what he must do in order for his
action to cohere with his meta-intention for union with God. As a result, the Spirit brings
to his remembrance a Scripture such as Matthew 25:35, where Jesus says, “Truly I tell
you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did
it to me” (NRSV). The belief that he should be generous with his possessions and should
give to the poor, coupled with the correct perception of the situation, leads him to believe
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that he ought to, indeed that he will, use some of his money to buy food for the homeless
person.
Of course, the relevant content can come from any number of sources. The Spirit
could have brought to Bobby’s attention his memory of a sermon he heard from a
minister or priest, some words from the previous Sunday’s liturgy about taking care of
the poor, or some experience in which someone showed him mercy and compassion
when he was going through a difficult time. All of these sources of the relevant beliefs
are legitimate, and the Spirit brings these beliefs to the attention of the believer at the
appropriate time by working in and through his memory. After all, memory is a faculty
that does not generate new information but preserves information one already believes or
knows. 58 With the help of liturgy, Scripture, teachers, and spiritual guides, Bobby already
knows what the Christian life entails, but he needs guidance from the Holy Spirit when it
comes to deciding on the correct means that will contribute to the fulfillment of his metaintention. The Spirit’s work in and through Bobby’s memories is thus an important part
of leading him to the particular actions that will contribute to the fulfillment of Bobby’s
meta-intention for union with God.
In addition to working in Bobby’s memory to bring certain truths to his attention,
the Spirit must also help him to “see” or perceive the situation correctly. After all,
without the Spirit’s involvement, Bobby would probably have perceived the situation in
light of his greed and the homeless person as a threat to his amassing more wealth. In
such perception, desire thus plays a key role in motivating the correct diagnosis of a

58. For this understanding of memory as a faculty which preserves knowledge, see Sven
Bernecker, “Memory Knowledge,” in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, eds., The Routledge
Companion to Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 2011), 326-27; Robert Audi, Epistemology: A
Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 66-67.
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situation. If Bobby is primarily motivated by a desire for increasing his wealth, then he
will be tempted to ignore the evidence that is right in front of him. Alternatively, if he has
a strong desire for union with God, and if the Spirit brings to his immediate attention his
memory of the Scripture mentioned above, then he will not be closed off to the reality of
the situation and he will able to make a correct judgment. Thus, both the right memories
and a correct perception of the situation are important, though certainly not the only,
ways in which the Spirit might guide someone like Bobby to believe that he ought to do a
particular action at a certain time.
From the example above, it is clear that both the relevant beliefs and desires in
intention-formation are mutually reinforcing mental states. One’s desire both for union
with God as one’s ultimate end and for eventually loving God for God’s own sake opens
one up to the Spirit illumining one to perceive a given situation correctly. Conversely,
coming to believe that a particular action will contribute to the end that one desires will
enable such meta-intentional desire to extend to the particular action, thus motivating one
to act in that way. When one comes to believe that she should (and that she in fact will)
perform the action, then she will intend the action as long as her desire for union with
God extends to the present action, and no competing desire gets in the way. Such a
proximal intention for a present action will trigger the action-related mechanisms that
initiate and probably will motivate the completion of the action.
Although such an account of auxiliary proximal intentions shows how the Spirit
produces in the believer the mental states necessary for having an intention to do a
particular action, there is still the issue of sinful desires that persist even after one initially
converts to Christianity. How can the believer intend and thus perform a particular action
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the Spirit guides her to do when she desires to act in a way that is incompatible with that
action? Admittedly, there are no easy answers here. At the beginning of the journey
towards beatitude, competing desires are a serious problem that could get in the way of
one’s intending the right actions. However, even though the theological virtues by which
one intends union with God begin as initially weak tendencies, they are still strong
enough to redirect one’s actions, generally speaking. Moreover, as one performs more
Spirit-guided actions, it becomes easier to do those actions. Thus, at the beginning, the
Spirit’s illumining work in guiding one to do a particular action might be undermined by
one’s sinful desires to do the opposite. Bobby might initially struggle to perceive the
homeless person correctly and might ignore the Spirit’s promptings, but over time such
promptings will lead him to intend the action more consistently. As he successfully acts
as the result of the Spirit’s redirecting of his intention, he is more easily led by the Spirit
in future situations.
One aspect of the spiritual life that is indispensable to this gradual process of
spiritual formation is the social context within which one is formed in the spiritual life.
Far from being an unimportant appendage to a largely individualistic process, the life
guided by the Spirit requires people who can help one grow in the fulfillment of her
meta-intention as well as hold her accountable to the lifestyle that contributes to that
end. 59 Such spiritual relationships are especially necessary when it comes to new
converts who still struggle with their sinful desires. With people who can help provide

59. I recognize how ironic it is that the discussion of the social dimension of spiritual formation
receives only a small amount of space here. However, to include an extensive discussion of the social
dimension would extend outside the parameters of the project. This would certainly be a valuable area of
further exploration, seeing how my discussion of how the Spirit indwells specific believers would easily
extend to the Spirit indwelling many believers, guiding all of them to work together in moving towards
union with God.
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safeguards against sinful behavior, even a believer whose intention-related tendencies for
union with God are weak will be able to intend and perform actions that contribute to her
ultimate end in an environment that is conducive to her successful growth. 60
By understanding the Spirit’s auxiliary grace as the production of proximal
intentions for particular actions, we also can see Aquinas’s vast vision for how the many
infused dispositions gradually become rooted in the believer. As stated earlier in
reference to the theological virtues, the infused cardinal virtues and the gifts of the Holy
Spirit are all infused into the believer as the result of the Spirit’s indwelling. The
indwelling of uncreated Love in the soul creates an imprint of that love in the believer
that functions not only as that which mediates the indwelling of the Spirit but also as the
created change that is necessary for humans to participate in the Holy Spirit who is Love.
Such created grace grants believers the capacity for supernatural participatory action,
though such grace does not itself actualize such potential. Rather, it is the work of the
Spirit’s auxiliary grace that makes such glorious potential a gradual actuality.
The infused virtues, then, are not like other virtues since they are infused by God
and are not acquired by human effort alone. However, such infused virtues are like other
virtues if we are referring to their being rooted in human nature. In that case, they are
acquired by human actions, though such actions are those that are guided by the Spirit’s
auxiliary grace. They are supernaturally infused as well as supernaturally enacted

60. Of course, such relationships can be abused. However, the alternative to pursuing the spiritual
life in community (i.e., pursuing it in an individualistic way) is not sufficient for one overcoming one’s
own sinful desires. After all, sometimes the believer can be his or her own worst enemy when it comes to
sinful desires because the possibility of self-deception would be very great indeed. However, there certainly
would need to be safeguards in whatever form of spiritual community one is involved in to prevent any
abuse of the vulnerable relationship of spiritual guidance. For a defense of the importance of guidance in
spiritual formation, see Frederick D. Aquino, “Spiritual Formation,” in The Oxford Handbook of the
Epistemology of Theology (forthcoming), ed. Frederick D. Aquino and William J. Abraham (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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dispositions. Thus, if we are considering the actualization of the infused cardinal virtues
and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, then such actualization is a gradual process since one
grows in these dispositions the more they are used. One becomes better at being guided
by the Holy Spirit when it comes to intending particular actions since the sinful desires
and dispositions gradually are replaced by the infused cardinal virtues, enabling the Spirit
more easily to be able to produce in believers intentions for particular virtuous actions.
Further, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are best understood in this light; they make even more
immediate the connection between the Spirit’s producing the intention and one’s doing
the intended action, so that the difference between the Spirit’s intentions and the
believer’s intentions (and actions) begins to fade. 61
Ultimately, the spiritual life is a growing participation in the Holy Spirit, who
appropriates God’s loving nature to the believer. Since the Spirit indwells the believer
inasmuch as she grows in the actualization of created grace, the believer’s participatory
actions and the gradually actualized dispositions bring the Spirit and the believer into an
ever closer union since the very love that mediates this indwelling is the resulting imprint
of God’s Love Himself indwelling the believer. In fact, through this growing union
between the believer and the Spirit, the believer participates in the life of the Trinity. Just
as the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and Son as the love that binds each to the
other, so the Spirit is also that Love by whom all believers are brought up into that same
loving union of the Trinity, though by participation and not by nature. By redirecting the
intention of believers generally towards their ultimate end and particularly towards

61. That is, the difference fades as far as is possible without blurring the distinction between God
and the believer. The goal is for the Spirit to work in and through one’s human processes and practices to
bring about transformation rather than take over the believer’s agency. The believer just begins to intend
the same things as she grows closer to the Spirit.
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actions that contribute to that end, the Holy Spirit directs and sustains believers
throughout their entire journey towards beatitude, though the believer’s growth will never
be complete in this life. Eschatologically, humans will be united with God no matter
where they are on the journey, but the Spirit guides believers along as far as is possible in
this life.
Possible Objections to the Account
With this account of how the Spirit redirects the intentionality of believers
towards union with God by indwelling them, there are two objections that might be raised
against it at this point. Such objections will help us to further clarify and understand how
the account fares against what might be common responses to it. 62 The first objection can
be called the post-baptism sin objection, and it might be raised as follows. If a believer
acts on a sinful desire after baptism, then one’s meta-intention towards union with God is
undermined since she desired some intrinsic end more than she desired union with God.
This objection would imply that with one’s meta-intention undermined, the Spirit would
no longer indwell the believer. After all, the Spirit’s indwelling infuses and begins to
actualize the theological virtues in the believer, which redirect one’s intention towards
union with God, so it would seem to follow that the undermining of such an intention
would also mean an undermining of the Spirit’s indwelling.
In response to this objection, it is important to keep in mind that the issue is really
about the connection between one’s desire for a particular action and one’s desire for
union with God. If a believer desires and performs some particular action that does not

62. My intention here is not to set up a straw man argument. I merely try to think of possible
objections that could be raised at this point of the account in order to provide greater clarity about what I
mean and do not mean.
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cohere with one’s desire for union with God, then it initially seems like the person no
longer intends to grow towards union with God but instead intends whatever state of
affairs (maybe amassing great wealth) she is now pursuing through this particular action.
In that case, one desires to bring about some sinful state of affairs more than one desires
to grow in divine-likeness, so the meta-intention no longer governs the direction of one’s
activity.
Although there is nothing inherently wrong with the reasoning of this objection, it
would only cover cases in which one intentionally acted against one’s meta-intention,
knowing full well at the time of the action that it opposed one’s desire for union with
God. Arguably, there are many cases of sinful behavior in which one does not have this
conscious knowledge of the incoherence of the action. Such cases would serve to show
that the cognitive condition for intending the particular action (or in this case intending to
refrain from acting) is somehow disrupted such that one would be convinced in the
moment that the action actually does cohere with one’s meta-intention, thus enabling one
both to intend to move towards union with God as well as to intend a particular sinful
action despite its being sinful. We might call such cases instances of self-deception.
Self-deception is the phenomenon in which a person 1) unconsciously believes
that she ought not to perform some action A, 2) desires to do A, and 3) as a result tells
herself that she should do A. 63 Self-deception does not entail believing that she should do
A because that would entail believing a contradiction; we cannot at the same time affirm
that we should do A and that we should not do A. Thus, one tells herself that she should
do the action. The true belief that she should not do A is unconscious in this type of case

63. For this preliminary definition of self-deception, see Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason, 211.
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since she would agree that she should not do it if questioned, but she does not have
conscious awareness of this belief (or she is not thinking about it at the time) because she
wants to do the action. Alternatively, it could be the case that in self-deception she
merely doesn’t pay attention to evidence that might point against her false belief. 64 She
might not pay attention to the relevant people, texts, etc. due to her motivation to do the
action. Self-deception, in this particular way of articulating the phenomenon, is often an
example of irrationality when it comes to action.
As an example of this phenomenon at work, let us say from our earlier example
that Bobby’s was a case of self-deception instead of an action caused by auxiliary grace.
Bobby walks towards the homeless man, and his desire not to give his money away leads
him to want to keep walking. If Bobby was questioned by a religious leader or friend,
then he would certainly agree that he should give some money to the homeless man.
However, in the moment, his desire to keep his money motivates him not to think about
his true belief and instead to tell himself that passing by the man is not a big deal, maybe
even that passing by the man coheres with his meta-intention for union with God. In that
case, he still intends union with God, but he sins because he temporarily forgets his true
belief or just ignores it as the result of his desire.
Cases of self-deception allow for the possibility that one might sin even after
baptism without the added consequence that one’s meta-intention is undermined by
desiring some object more than one desires union with God. Self-deception is able to

64. For this dimension of self-deception, see Alfred Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001), 25-27. See also Alfred Mele, “Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric
Delusions: On Robert Audi’s Transition from Self-Deception to Delusion,” in Rationality and the Good:
Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, ed. Mark Timmons, John Greco, and
Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163-66.

81
allow for this possibility because in it the cognitive condition for intending a particular
action is confused in that one sees an action (or lack of action) as coherent with one’s
pursuit of union with God despite the actual incoherence of the two and the person’s
actual belief that the two are incoherent. In the beginning of the spiritual life, believers
will certainly struggle with competing desires, but the point is that, in cases of selfdeception, believers will not experience such desires as conflicting until they recall their
true belief that they ought not do A and repent.
In fact, the very logic of repentance (and penance) entails that after one has
performed a sinful action and is made aware that such Aing was sinful, she then feels
guilty for Aing, repents (turn back) from Aing, and confesses her Aing to a spiritual
guide/priest. One would not feel such contrition at performing a sinful action if she did
not intend to pursue union with God generally and yet failed in this particular instance.
Of course, this is not to ignore cases in which one actually does intend an action while
being fully aware of its incoherence in relation to one’s meta-intention for union with
God. In that type of case, one’s intention for union with God would be undermined, thus
undermining the very actualization of the created effect by which the Spirit indwells
believers. However, even in the case with which I raised the objection, one is still able to
repent, reestablish one’s relationship with God and continue in one’s pursuit of union
with God. 65

65. In fact, one could say that these two different types of cases are ultimately pointing to the
distinction between mortal (mortalia) and venial (venialia) sin in Aquinas. See ST. IaIIae, Q. 88, A. 1.
Aquinas describes venial sin as “sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the
end itself being preserved,” similar to my conception of sins resulting from self-deception. Mortal sins can
be compared “with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect consisting in
the corruption of a principle,” thus relating to sins committed intentionally with full knowledge of the
incoherence between the action and one’s ultimate intended end such that one then desires something more
than union with God.
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Despite there being a possibility for sinful action that does not undermine one’s
meta-intention, however, it must be kept in mind that self-deceptive sin is still sin and
does not actually contribute to one’s moral progress. There still needs to be some way to
protect against even these instances or at least lessen the number of such instances.
Prayer, in the many forms it takes, is the perfect antidote to self-deception when it comes
to sin. In prayer, the believer turns her mind and attention to God, and so reduces the
possibility for absent-mindedness that eventually turns into self-deception. Such prayer
also opens up space for the Spirit to enable the believer to recall various pieces of content
that will fulfill the cognitive condition of auxiliary intentions described earlier. Prayer
thus functions in a two-fold way: protecting the believer from the dangers of selfdeception (motivated by sinful desires) and creating the opportunity for the Spirit to
produce the beliefs relevant for intending particular actions that contribute toward one’s
progress in the spiritual life.
The second objection that might be raised against the account is the free will
objection, and it might be raised in the following way. If the Spirit produces within
believers all that leads to virtuous actions, then it might seem to follow that such an
understanding of grace removes free will entirely. After all, humans would not be able to
do anything other than what the Spirit guided them (through their intending that end) to
do. Of course, my articulation of this objection presumes a libertarian understanding of
free will that requires at the very least that one have the ability to do otherwise than one
chooses to do, but even those who do not require alternative possibilities might still ask
how it is that the antecedent conditions of the Spirit’s activity fit with an understanding of
free will such that those very conditions do not undermine the free will. In response to the
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second objection, I think the account is consistent with human free will in a variety of
ways. If we conceive of free will as something like having the ability to do otherwise,
then it initially seems like the account would undermine this free will. However, as we
saw in answering the previous objection, believers still struggle with sin after baptism
even though the Spirit indwells them at that time. Such struggle with sin would only
make sense if believers had the ability to choose otherwise and ended up choosing actions
that were actually harmful to one’s spiritual progress. The eventual goal is that the
believer reaches the point in which she has alternative possibilities for action, but such
possibilities do not actually bear much weight in terms of what the person actually
intends to do.
Although the account does allow for the existence of alternative possibilities, we
might also question whether alternative possibilities are even necessary or important for
free will. Not only are there cases in which one has the ability to do otherwise and yet
still does not act freely (Frankfurt-style scenarios), but we might also question whether
having the possibility to sin without grace really is freedom at all or just a different kind
of bondage. 66 If we take the entire metaphysical background of human action seriously,
then the prior context of sin would naturally lead us to affirm that the latter is true since
humans, with the alternative possibilities both to sin and not to sin, would inevitably act
out of selfish motivation rather than love.

66. For an excellent discussion of Frankfurt style cases and how they undermine the alternative
possibilities requirement, see Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will,” in
Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 286-90.
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Without union with God as their intended end, humans instead pursue various
ends that are of a material nature, a pursuit that is only reinforced and motivated by this
context of sin. As James Wetzel states concerning Augustine’s position, “we are always
oriented to act in particular ways and lack the power to change our fundamental
orientations at will. We are incapable of acting without drawing upon a context of prior
motivation.” 67 However, in addition to taking seriously the context within which humans
act (saturated in sin), we must also take seriously the ultimate end of human existence,
namely union with God. The question comes down to this: is one truly free if she
constantly acts in sinful ways that prevent her from moving towards her proper end as a
human being? If this is free will, it is certainly not a model of free will that takes the
spiritual life seriously.
Such reasons take care of the side of the objection concerning alternative
possibilities, but they do not deal sufficiently with the final part of the objection
concerning how the Spirit’s indwelling actually affirms human free will. If we rule out
alternative possibilities as sufficient for free will and affirm that only freedom to pursue
the good is really freedom, then it seems like this leaves us with an understanding of
freedom such that one is able to act in the ways in which one intends to act. If I go to the
supermarket as the result of my intending to go, then this would be an instance of
voluntary action or free will. I perform the action because I want to go and I firmly
believe that I will go. Crucial to this conception of free will is that one performs an action
as the result of one’s own beliefs and desires. 68

67. See James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), 198. Aquinas shares this same sort of posture towards the relationship between free will and
sin. See the discussion in Congar, I Believe, 125-26.
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The account of the Spirit’s indwelling and influence on the actions of believers
presented above would be compatible with this particular sense of free will. The Spirit
redirects the intention of believers generally towards union with God by indwelling them,
and causes particular intentions (combinations of desire and belief) that trigger the
relevant actional mechanisms, placing believers in the best possible position either for
acting in a way that contributes to this end or refraining from acting in a way that opposes
this end. 69 The believer acts as the result of her own desires and beliefs and is thus
enabled to pursue union with God, the very end that will truly enable her to fulfill her
ultimate natural desire, namely the fulfillment or happiness. The Spirit does not indwell
believers in order to transform them into spirit-robots but instead works in and through
the believer’s own natural processes to draw humans gradually into a supernatural form
of existence. As a result, not only is the account articulated here compatible with the
reality of sins committed post-baptism but also with the believer’s free will.

68. This account of freedom actually resembles Aquinas’s own account, though with a different
terminology and concepts concerning action theory. Aquinas argues that free will entails a proper
connection between the intellect and will and the action that results from them. See Stump, 2002. For a
more extended account, see also Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 277-306. Stump
argues that Aquinas’s position can best be understood as a type of Libertarianism, one that denies the
necessity of alternative possibilities. I do not want to contest this notion here, though it seems compatible
with some forms of compatibilism as well, depending on the how one uses those terms. Of course,
providing a full-blown account of this issue lies outside the scope of this project. See also ST. Ia, 83, 4.
69. One might respond that if the Spirit intensifies our desires for something or works through our
cognitive processes to lead us to believe certain propositions, then the Spirit is still essentially controlling
us. However, it is unclear how such cases would be different than the way that advertisements or songs that
utilize certain biological triggers influence desire. There are many instances of the manipulation of one’s
desires in which we would still say the person acted freely. The relevant factor here is not what led me to
desire something (after all, how much conscious control do we have over our desires) but whether I am able
to act out of my desire and beliefs.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
In what has preceded, I have sought to develop a constructive account of how the
Holy Spirit guides the actions of believers on a day-to-day basis by indwelling them. I
have argued that the Spirit, by indwelling believers, redirects their intentionality toward
union with God, placing believers in the best possible position for performing actions that
contribute to that end. The Spirit, as the Love shared between the Father and Son, gives
himself and is given to believers upon baptism in order to enable them gradually to
participate in the life of the Trinity. The Spirit enables believers to participate in the
divine life by giving them the gift of created grace, which not only elevates humans to act
in this way but also makes such an indwelling possible in the first place by mediating the
cognitive contact between the Spirit and believers.
Through created grace, then, the Spirit redirects the intentionality of believers
towards union with God in two ways. The Spirit redirects their intentionality in a general
way (meta-intention) through the gradual enactment of the theological virtues, and the
Spirit also produces, in believers, intentions for particular actions that contribute to the
spiritual formation of the believer towards her intended end, namely union with God. In
this way, I have sought to bring Aquinas’s pneumatology into conversation with
contemporary philosophy of intention in order to make greater sense both of the
metaphysical and the volitional implications of the indwelling of the Spirit.
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If the account of how the Spirit guides believers by indwelling them has
succeeded, then it may have serious implications for how believers perceive and
understand their day-to-day existence. In a society that has many seemingly secular
realms that lack any religious sensibility, there are many aspects of the life of the believer
that may not seem to have any sort of supernatural element. 1 It might seem as though the
believer only experiences the divine through liturgy, icons, sacred texts, sacraments and
the like. However, if this account of how the Spirit guides believers by indwelling them
has succeeded, then all aspects of the believer’s existence are infused with grace and the
Spirit’s presence. Even the mundane aspects of human existence like driving to the
supermarket or doing one’s taxes, are opportunities for one to be guided by the Spirit. In
fact, we can speak of the indwelling not only in terms of the believer’s participation in
the sacraments (though these are crucial for initiating, sustaining, and intensifying that
indwelling union) but also in terms of the day-to-day intentions and actions of the
believer. This way of speaking about the indwelling is important because one might get
the sense that she only comes into contact with God once a week (or possibly twice a
year for some). However, when it comes to the indwelling of the Spirit, theologians must
understand it both in terms of sacraments and in terms of the day-to-day lives of
believers. As a result, this project could be conceived as an attempt to develop a
pneumatology of the mundane, taking seriously the day-to-day guidance of the Spirit
over the actions of believers.
Because I have emphasized this aspect of the indwelling of the Spirit and limited
myself to the tools of philosophy of intention, there are many ways that this project can

1. This is one of the meanings of the terms secular described in Charles Taylor, A Secular Age
(Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 2-5.
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be further developed, and I hope to explore these areas in future work on this topic.
Despite the importance of thinking about the day-to-day guidance of the Spirit over the
actions of believers, one important area that can develop my work here is to give a
greater treatment of how the various sacraments relate to the day-to-day guidance of the
Spirit. I have discussed baptism and the Eucharist to some degree in this project, but there
is plenty of room to further investigate how these sacraments and others relate to what
has been discussed here. How can we understand the connection between the Spirit’s
work in and through the sacraments and the Spirit’s day-to-day guidance of believers?
Another important future line of investigation closely relates to this greater
attention on the sacraments. When it comes to the Eucharist, especially, individual
believers are joined together in a real way to Christ, becoming Christ’s body in their
participation in the sacrament. In this way, the indwelling of the Spirit has an inherently
social dimension in that the Spirit not only indwells individual believers but also indwells
entire churches (indeed the Church universal). With this social dimension in mind, a
fruitful way to expand the present project would be to consider the Church as a social
agent guided by the Spirit (Spirit-Ecclesiology) to accomplish tasks that only a group of
people coordinating their gifts and abilities are able. Michael Bratman has recently
written on the nature of social agency, and his work could fruitfully contribute to a SpiritEcclesiology of social agency guided by the Spirit. 2 Although I argued here that the Spirit
redirects the intentions of believers towards union with God, this future project would
attempt to show how the Spirit coordinates these intentions so that believers are able to

2. See Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
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act together to accomplish goals important to the pursuit of union with God and draw
non-believers towards that pursuit as well.
In addition to expanding the present project in a social, ecclesial direction, there
are many other tools that could help add philosophical depth and clarity to the
understanding of the metaphysical and volitional dimensions of the indwelling explored
here. For example, one possible area of investigation would be to utilize contemporary
phenomenology of religion to explore whether the Spirit’s indwelling is something that
believer actually experience (is there some phenomenal content?), and if so, whether such
experiences can be described. Necessary for this line of inquiry would be actual firsthand accounts of believers describing their baptisms and experiences of the presence of
God in that moment, taking such experiences seriously rather than treating them as mere
psychological events that have no objective basis outside of the mind. 3 Developing such
an understanding would build on what I have done in this project since I have treated how
the Spirit enters into the action-related processes of believers but have not explored what
the believer experiences (consciously) while the Spirit indwells. Through these three
areas of inquiry, I hope to expand my work in this project by drawing on the relevant
tools insofar as they contribute to understanding the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in fresh
ways.

3. Here, I am especially thinking of Robert Sokolowski’s discussions of “theologies of disclosure”
or Jean-Luc Marion’s accounts of “saturated phenomenon.” See Robert Sokolowski, Eucharistic Presence:
A Study of the Theology of Disclosure (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1994); Jean-Luc Marion, “The
Saturated Phenomenon,” in Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate, ed.
Dominique Janicaud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 176-216.
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